Lesson Report:
**Title: Propaganda as a Weapon: Hybrid Warfare, Legitimacy, and Soviet-Style Active Measures**
In this session, the class moved from a psychological understanding of why humans are vulnerable to propaganda to a political-strategic analysis of how states weaponize that vulnerability. Using war as an extreme case, the instructor introduced the concepts of information warfare, hybrid warfare, and Soviet/Russian “active measures,� culminating in an applied research task on Operation INFEKTION. The broader objective for the week was framed as understanding how powerful actors convert disinformation into real strategic outcomes in international politics.
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### Attendance
– Number of students explicitly mentioned absent in the transcript: **0**
(No absences were recorded or discussed.)
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### Topics Covered (Chronological, with Detailed Progression)
#### 1. Framing the Week: From Human Vulnerability to State Strategy
– The instructor briefly recapped the prior session:
– The class had previously discussed **what propaganda is** and constructed a **working definition** together.
– They also examined **why human beings are so vulnerable** to propaganda, emphasizing the emotional side of persuasion.
– Key idea: Most real-world persuasion targets **emotions** rather than rational faculties.
– Shift in focus:
– The instructor emphasized that this is **not a pop psychology course**; the content must be grounded in **politics and political science**.
– New guiding question for this week:
– If humans are vulnerable to propaganda, **how do powerful actors (especially states) exploit these vulnerabilities** to achieve **real strategic and political outcomes**?
– This frames the entire week: moving from individual-level vulnerability to **state-level strategic use** of information.
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#### 2. Starting at the Extreme: What Is War?
– To illustrate the stakes of propaganda, the instructor chose an **extreme case**: **war**.
– Open discussion prompt:
– “What is war? What does war mean to you? What does it entail?â€�
– Follow-up: “Is it a fun and good thing that you like to do? If not, why not?â€�
– Student responses (synthesized by instructor):
– War as **conflict between two or more actors**, typically **states**.
– Strong association with:
– **Armed violence**, **military force**, **guns**, **tanks**, **bombs**, **airplanes**, **ships**, **helicopters**.
– **Fear**, **hatred**, and **damage on both sides**.
– **Competition for power**; attempts to **gain or keep power**.
– **Territory, land, resources, security, status**, and **“area of influenceâ€�**.
– The instructor highlighted that **not every conflict is war**:
– E.g., states may argue or dislike each other without being at war.
– Pedagogical goal:
– Surface and make explicit the **imagery and assumptions** students have about war:
– War as **bloodshed**, **physical battlefields**, and **heavy weaponry**.
– This set up a contrast with the **changing nature** of warfare in the modern era.
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#### 3. War Beyond the Battlefield: Thornton and the “War for Minds�
– The instructor connected the discussion to one of the assigned authors for the week:
– **Thornton**, who argues that:
– Modern war is less about **mass killing on battlefields** and more about a **“fight for the minds of people.â€�**
– **Propaganda** becomes a core **weapon** in “war on the mind.â€�
– Introduced a key quotation (via chat) from Russian General **Valery Gerasimov**:
> “The role of non-military means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown and in many cases they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness.�
– The instructor signaled the importance of this quote as a **starting point for reflection**:
– Students were asked:
– What is changing about war according to Gerasimov?
– How is it changing?
– Why is it changing in that way?
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#### 4. Why Do States Go to War? Material vs Political Goals
– Before unpacking Gerasimov, the instructor asked:
– Why do states fight wars? What do they typically want to **gain**?
– Student contributions were categorized:
– **Material goals**:
– **Resources**: food, water, land, weapons.
– **Territory**: land area, strategic locations.
– **Economic strength** and **security of supply**.
– **Political/strategic goals**:
– **Power and status** (e.g., “keep statusâ€�).
– **Security** and **expanding spheres of influence**.
– **Control of information**.
– More abstract political aims (e.g., reshaping regional orders).
– Instructor synthesis:
– States go to war to **gain something**—material, strategic, and political.
– These categories often **overlap** (e.g., territory can be both material and strategic).
– War is extremely **costly**, so it is undertaken to secure **valuable gains**.
– Linking back to Gerasimov:
– The quote suggests a **shift in the primary tools** used to pursue those gains:
– From **direct military force** to **non-military means**.
– These non-military means can, in many cases, be **more effective** than weapons.
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#### 5. The Changing Character of War: Non-Military, Economic, and Informational Tools
– Students proposed **examples of non-military warfare**:
– **Economic tools**:
– Trade wars.
– **Sanctions**.
– “Economic warâ€� as a form of state confrontation.
– **Digital/technological tools**:
– **Cyber warfare**.
– Digital attacks and tech-driven operations.
– The instructor acknowledged diplomacy as another tool, but flagged it as often **conceptually distinct** from war, even if it’s used to achieve similar political ends.
– Emphasis was put on **information** as a modern “main weaponâ€�:
– Students mentioned:
– **Information warfare**.
– “Information wars.â€�
– The use of **technology** to achieve strategic goals.
– The instructor highlighted that **information operations** are central to what Gerasimov is talking about.
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#### 6. Information Warfare and Hybrid Warfare: War for Legitimacy and the Will to Fight
– Concept introduction:
– **Information warfare**: using information (and disinformation) as an instrument of conflict.
– **Hybrid warfare**:
– A mix of **military** and **non-military** tools.
– One of its “primary battlefieldsâ€� is not physical territory but the **minds of citizens**.
– Key strategic objectives in information/hybrid warfare:
1. **Destroy the enemy’s will to fight**:
– If soldiers and citizens **do not want to fight**, the state’s war capacity is critically weakened.
2. **Undermine trust in the enemy’s government**:
– If people **distrust their government**, they are far less likely to:
– Support its policies.
– Accept its narratives about the conflict.
– Sacrifice or risk their lives for it.
– Connection to **legitimacy**:
– A student (Elaine) explicitly linked this to **legitimacy**.
– Defined as the **support of people for their government’s actions**.
– If people are exposed to persuasive propaganda from an adversary and come to believe that:
– Their own government is wrong, corrupt, or incompetent, or
– The enemy’s position is more justified,
– then the government’s **actions are no longer perceived as legitimate**.
– The instructor connected this to the **introduction-to-political-science notion of legitimacy**:
– Legitimacy = the **level of trust** citizens place in their government.
– Governments depend on this trust and a **social contract** to use their **monopoly on force**.
– Conclusion:
– **Information warfare directly targets legitimacy**, even if it does not attempt to make the target population fully support the opposing side.
– Sometimes it is sufficient to **induce confusion, doubt, and distrust** toward one’s own government.
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#### 7. Clarifying the Focus: Russian Practices and Generalizability
– The instructor outlined that:
– The course will **focus on Russian methods** of information warfare and propaganda this week.
– Rationale:
– Russian/Soviet practices are **particularly well-documented**, allowing for **granular analysis**.
– Important caveat:
– Russia is **not** the only state practicing information warfare.
– **All superpowers** and many lesser powers have used **information operations** historically.
– However, Russian examples (especially Soviet-era and post-Soviet) offer rich case material for understanding **mechanisms** and **processes**.
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#### 8. Introduction to “Active Measures� (�ктивные меропри�ти�)
– New core concept:
– **Active measures** (Russian: *aktivnye meropriyatiya*).
– Introduced as a key part of Soviet/Russian **hybrid and information warfare**.
– Informal knowledge check:
– Instructor asked for a show of hands/thumbs-up from anyone who had heard the term.
– A few students indicated familiarity.
– Several were called on to describe it:
– Helen: **state influence and manipulation without weapons**; increasing influence and achieving goals without overt military force.
– Ali Khan: **secret actions** to influence other countries—covert operations.
– Others: linked it to **psyops** (psychological operations) and covert intelligence activities.
– Instructor synthesis:
– **Active measures** are:
– Covert, often **intelligence-directed operations**.
– Designed to **manipulate perceptions and politics** in other states.
– A tactic within **hybrid warfare** and **information warfare**.
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#### 9. Mechanism of Active Measures: Source Laundering Analogy
– The instructor explained **how active measures work in practice**, using an analogy:
**a. Money Laundering as an Analogy**
– Students were asked what **money laundering** is:
– Answer: Taking **illegally obtained money** and making it appear **legitimate**.
– Common method: Run illicit money through **fake or complicit businesses**, then report it as genuine business revenue.
– Key point:
– The goal is to take something **tainted** (illegal funds) and process it so that it **appears clean and legitimate**.
**b. Source Laundering**
– The instructor introduced **source laundering** as the informational analogue of money laundering.
– Steps in a typical **active-measures/source-laundering operation**:
1. **Create/identify a piece of information**:
– E.g., an allegation that a foreign president engaged in scandalous, unverifiable acts 20 years ago.
– This can be **false**, **exaggerated**, or **unverifiable**.
2. **Covertly produce or forge a “document�**:
– A letter, intelligence cable, official-looking report, or communication.
– It appears to be an authentic record from some bureaucratic or official context.
3. **Plant the document in an obscure outlet**:
– Publish it in a **little-known foreign newspaper**, a fringe magazine, or an obscure journal.
– Alternatively, leak it to a peripheral media outlet or a small organization in a third country.
– The key: it now **exists in writing** in the public information environment.
4. **Exploit the psychological power of written sources**:
– People intuitively assign more **credibility** to:
– Items in print.
– Materials in news outlets.
– Citations in books or journals.
– There is a big difference between **hearing a rumor** and **seeing it in a newspaper or book**.
5. **Amplify and re-circulate**:
– The story is then:
– Picked up by other small outlets (sometimes organically, sometimes through **carefully managed promotion**).
– Cited by slightly more reputable or larger media.
– Gradually migrates through a chain of **increasingly mainstream** sources.
– The sponsoring state can assist by:
– Quietly encouraging allied or sympathetic media to **re-report** the claim.
– Having front organizations or friendly commentators cite the original obscure piece.
6. **Achieve “truth status�**:
– Eventually, the allegation is:
– Quoted in reputable outlets.
– Included in **secondary literature**, commentaries, maybe even **academic or quasi-academic works**.
– At that point, if a person searches for information on the topic:
– They see references across multiple outlets.
– The claim appears to be well-established, because it is **everywhere**.
– The information has now been effectively **“launderedâ€�**:
– It no longer looks like a partisan or state-driven narrative.
– It appears to be **neutral, external, and credible**.
– Strategic advantage:
– The story no longer appears to come from a **self-interested adversary government**.
– It seems to come from **independent, neutral, or third-party sources**, which are more likely to be trusted by the targeted population.
– This allows the disinformation to work as a **weaponized narrative** within the target society.
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#### 10. Historical Context and New Technologies
– Timeframe:
– The instructor noted that **active measures** and source laundering were widely used during the **Cold War**, **before the internet**.
– They were already powerful in a world of print media, radio, and limited television.
– Modern transformation:
– With the rise of the **internet**, **social media**, and **platforms like Twitter**, the **scale and speed** of source laundering have increased dramatically.
– The instructor flagged:
– **Bot farms** and coordinated online accounts.
– Rapid, viral dissemination mechanisms.
– These new tools make it much easier to:
– Seed stories in many locations quickly.
– Manufacture the **appearance of consensus or widespread belief**.
– The instructor emphasized that these developments will be examined in more detail **later in the semester**.
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#### 11. Transition to Case Study: Operation INFEKTION (Soviet AIDS Disinformation Campaign)
– To reduce strain on their voice and involve students more actively, the instructor transitioned to a **“read and reportâ€� activity**.
– Context provided:
– **Time period**: 1980s, late Cold War.
– **Crisis**: global public health emergency related to **HIV/AIDS**.
– At the time, there was:
– Major uncertainty about **origin**, **transmission**, and **treatment**.
– High levels of **fear** and **stigma**.
– Introduction to **Operation INFEKTION**:
– Described as a **Soviet psychological operation** (psyop).
– Strategic goal:
– Convince global audiences that the **United States government had created AIDS** and was responsible for its spread.
– This would:
– **Damage U.S. legitimacy**.
– Portray the U.S. as **morally monstrous** and dangerous.
– Exploit existing fears and uncertainties in the global public.
– Student task:
– Students were instructed to:
– Spend a few minutes on Google researching **“Operation Infectionâ€� (INFEKTION)** specifically in the context of **active measures**.
– Focus on **how** the active-measures process already described (source laundering, seeding, amplification) was applied in this particular case.
– Prepare to come back and **discuss what they found**:
– What specific steps the Soviets took.
– How the story was planted and spread.
– How it illustrates the **source-laundering model** of active measures.
– Time frame:
– Approximately 2–5 minutes of independent research before group discussion.
– The instructor mentioned this case would be revisited in more detail (and connected to other examples, including questions about U.S. operations like in Venezuela) in **Thursday’s session**.
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### Actionable Items for the Instructor
#### High Urgency – Before the Next Class
– **Debrief Operation INFEKTION**
– Have students report back on:
– Which sources they found.
– How the Soviets:
– Forged or manufactured documents.
– Planted stories in obscure outlets (e.g., small newspapers in other countries).
– Amplified them into mainstream/global narratives.
– Explicitly map their findings onto the **step-by-step source-laundering framework** introduced in this session.
– **Connect Back to Gerasimov and Thornton**
– Reference the Gerasimov quote again and ask:
– How does Operation INFEKTION illustrate the **primacy of non-military means**?
– In what ways did this operation potentially achieve **political and strategic goals** without using traditional weapons?
– **Follow-up on Student Question about U.S. Operations (e.g., Venezuela)**
– A student explicitly asked whether a specific U.S. operation in Venezuela relates to active measures.
– Plan to:
– Either prepare a brief comparative example.
– Or turn it into a **research/discussion prompt** to show that **active measures are not unique to Russia**.
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#### Short-Term (This Week)
– **Clarify and Assign Readings (Thornton, Howard, etc.)**
– Students were told they did not need to have completed the reading for this session.
– Make sure the exact pages/chapters on:
– **Hybrid warfare**,
– **Information warfare**, and
– **Active measures**
are clearly assigned and referenced in upcoming sessions.
– **Reinforce Core Concepts and Vocabulary**
– Ensure students can clearly define and distinguish:
– **Propaganda** (as defined in earlier class).
– **Information warfare**.
– **Hybrid warfare**.
– **Legitimacy** (in political science terms).
– **Active measures / aktivnye meropriyatiya**.
– **Psyops** and **source laundering**.
– Consider a brief **concept check** quiz or discussion start-of-class warm-up.
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#### Longer-Term / For Course Planning
– **Plan Future Case Studies Beyond Russia**
– To avoid the impression that only Russia uses these practices:
– Integrate at least one **non-Russian example** (e.g., U.S., UK, China) of information operations/active measures later in the course.
– This will also allow engagement with the “USA as a major hybrid warfare actorâ€� comment made by a student.
– **Design an Argumentative Assignment**
– A student’s remark (e.g., about the U.S. and “fake newsâ€� or hybrid warfare) could serve as a springboard for:
– A **short paper or final project** on:
– Comparative information warfare.
– Evaluating evidence for claims about which state actors are most active/effective in hybrid warfare.
– Encourage students to rigorously substantiate such claims with **sources and documented operations**.
– **Monitor and Support Terminology for Non-PS Majors**
– Since some students are “joining this class for funâ€� and may not be political science majors:
– Periodically revisit core PS concepts:
– Legitimacy.
– Social contract.
– Monopoly on force.
– Ensure they are concretely linked to the new material on propaganda and information warfare.
– **Consider Recording/Voice Management Adjustments**
– The instructor mentioned their voice was “hanging on by a thread.â€�
– It may be helpful to:
– Plan more **student-led activities** (read-and-report, group work) on heavy lecture days.
– Possibly provide **short written summaries or diagrams** of complex mechanisms (like active measures) to reduce repeated explanation load.
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This report captures the conceptual arc of the class: from defining war in traditional terms, to understanding how non-military tools—especially information and propaganda—have become central to modern conflict through mechanisms like active measures and source laundering, with Operation INFEKTION set up as the key applied case study for the next discussion.
Homework Instructions:
NO HOMEWORK
The only task assigned was an in-class “read and report� activity where students were told to “spend a little bit of time on Google� to look up Operation Infection and “come back in no more than five minutes right at 38 to discuss,� which is clearly meant to be completed during the session rather than as homework.