Lesson Report:
# Title: Week 16 Intelligence Briefings — Course Evaluations, Greenland/U.S. Tensions, Iran-U.S. De-escalation, and Houthi Red Sea Disruption
This final-week class was dedicated primarily to student intelligence briefing presentations, with an initial block reserved for course evaluations and instructor feedback. The session focused on applying forecasting, diagnostic reasoning, costly/cheap signals, and scenario analysis to contemporary geopolitical crisis cases, with students presenting and defending probability assessments through structured Q&A.
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# Attendance
– **Explicitly marked absent:** None mentioned by name during the class.
– **Number of students mentioned absent:** 0
– **Attendance-related notes:**
– At the end of class, one student spoke with the instructor about whether they were supposed to present and mentioned/was asked about getting a **Spravka**. The student’s identity was not clear from the transcript and no confirmed absence was recorded.
– The instructor noted that only **three** presentations were completed, even though **four** had been scheduled for the day.
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# Topics Covered
## 1. Opening: Week 16 / Final Week Logistics
– The instructor opened by identifying the class as **Week 16, the last week of classes**.
– The main plan for the week was announced:
– The week would be dedicated to **student presentations**.
– The instructor expected **four presentations** to be completed during this session.
– The instructor framed the day as part of the course’s final assessment/presentation sequence.
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## 2. Course Evaluations: Purpose, Importance, and In-Class Completion Time
– Before presentations began, the instructor prioritized **course evaluations**.
– The instructor explained why evaluations were particularly important for this course:
– The class is a **brand new course**.
– The material and skills developed throughout the semester were described as somewhat **unorthodox**, **experimental**, and possibly **clunky** in execution.
– The instructor expects to teach the course again and wants feedback to improve it for future students.
– The instructor asked students to provide honest feedback on:
– What they actually gained from the class.
– What they did not gain.
– What they liked.
– What could be improved in future semesters.
– Students were given approximately the first **10 minutes** of class to complete evaluations using the course evaluation link sent by email.
– The instructor thanked students in multiple languages for completing the evaluations, including:
– Russian: “Spasibo bolshoye”
– Kyrgyz/Tajik phrase: “Chong rahmat” / “Chagrah rahmat” as transcribed
– French: “Merci beaucoup”
– Shughni: after asking a student how to say “thank you” in Shughni, the instructor repeated what sounded like **“Kolom”** based on the student’s response.
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## 3. Presentation Format and Audience Responsibilities
– After course evaluations, the instructor transitioned to student presentations.
– The presentation format was explained:
– Each presenter had **5 minutes** to deliver an **intelligence briefing**.
– The audience would then have **5 minutes of Q&A**.
– The audience was framed as the **“situation room.”**
– The instructor required every student listening to prepare at least **one question**.
– Students were told to focus their questions on:
– Whether claims were substantiated.
– Whether the presenter had sources for factual claims.
– Whether reasoning was clear or whether there were unexplained jumps in logic.
– Whether the presenter could defend specific claims, evidence, and forecasting judgments.
– The instructor gave an example of a possible substantiation question:
– If a presenter claimed that “in 2024 there were 50 new ships moved into the Strait of Hormuz,” the audience should ask where that information came from.
– The instructor emphasized that students did not necessarily need to include deep citations for every statement in the presentation itself, but they should be ready to justify claims during Q&A.
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## 4. Presentation 1 — Baktybekov Azamat Baktybekovich: U.S.-Greenland/Denmark Tensions and the Logic of American Pressure
### 4.1 Presentation Overview
– **Presenter:** Baktybekov Azamat Baktybekovich
– **Topic:** Tensions between the United States and Greenland/Denmark, focusing on U.S. political pressure and the possibility of escalation.
– Azamat framed the case as an issue involving:
– U.S. interest in expanding influence over Greenland.
– Greenland’s status and Denmark’s sovereignty.
– The relationship between U.S. security interests and allied sovereignty.
– Whether U.S. rhetoric and pressure are best explained by strategic material needs or by a constructed security hierarchy.
### 4.2 Historical and Strategic Context
– Azamat referenced a **1951 agreement** between the U.S. and Denmark/Greenland that allowed the United States military access in Greenland.
– He discussed existing U.S. access to Greenland, including:
– Military facilities.
– Space-related and surveillance infrastructure.
– Existing legal/operational access through defense arrangements.
– He argued that because the U.S. already has military access, demands for acquisition or ownership cannot be fully explained by simple strategic need.
### 4.3 Diagnostic Explanations
Azamat presented two competing diagnostics:
#### Diagnostic A — Strategic Materialism / Realist Strategic Explanation
– Greenland matters because of:
– Russian activity in the Arctic.
– Chinese interest in the Arctic.
– Missile warning and surveillance infrastructure.
– Minerals and strategic resources.
– Arctic geopolitical competition.
– Under this diagnostic, U.S. concern would be driven primarily by material security interests.
#### Diagnostic B — Constructivist / Hierarchical Security Logic
– Azamat argued that Diagnostic B was stronger.
– This explanation centered on:
– U.S. assumptions of dominance over smaller allies.
– Trump-era ownership language toward Greenland.
– The idea that the U.S. treats Greenland less as a sovereign political community and more as an object of acquisition.
– A hierarchical view in which smaller allies’ agency is minimized.
– Azamat’s main claim was that the crisis is not simply about Greenland’s strategic value, but about how the U.S. imagines its power and entitlement in relation to smaller allies.
### 4.4 Assessment and Forecast
– Azamat assessed that the situation is likely to remain **unresolved** in the short-to-medium term.
– He argued that:
– Since mid-February, there had been more **media movement** and rhetoric than concrete U.S. action.
– The U.S. may continue using pressure, negotiation, and rhetorical provocation, but actual escalation would be difficult.
– A military move against Greenland/Denmark would create serious problems for U.S. alliance credibility, especially within NATO.
– Azamat emphasized that the central unresolved question is:
– **Who has power over Greenland’s future?**
– He concluded that all parties currently appear to prefer **stability** while maintaining their main positions.
### 4.5 Q&A: Student Questions and Contributions
#### Mamadboqirova Muqaddas Mamadboqirovna
– Asked about the likelihood of the conflict remaining at the **status quo** versus escalating in the future.
– Azamat responded that he expected the issue to remain unresolved.
– He compared the case to prior U.S. actions elsewhere but argued that Greenland is different because direct U.S. military action against Denmark/Greenland would violate NATO principles and could undermine the alliance.
#### Calmettes Zoe
– Asked about the U.S. position toward possible **European or NATO retaliation** if the U.S. clearly attempted to violate agreements or assert ownership over Greenland.
– Azamat answered that he did not see a specific U.S. position after Trump’s statements.
– Zoe followed up by asking whether the U.S. might be confident that Europe would do nothing.
– Azamat suggested that the U.S. was not necessarily confident and that the issue may still be in the planning or rhetorical stage.
#### Orolova Altynai Sharshenalyevna
– Asked Azamat to assign a score from **0 to 100** to each of his two diagnostics.
– Azamat rated his preferred explanation as essentially **100** and the alternative as **0**, indicating that he saw the constructivist explanation as fully dominant.
#### Jaimes Elena Mary
– Asked for clarification on Russia’s Arctic activity and China’s interests in Greenland/the Arctic.
– Azamat answered that Russia and China are interested in influence and great-power positioning in the Arctic.
– He suggested that although Russia and China may discuss plans or maintain interest, their activity appears more rhetorical/scientific than immediately operational.
#### Uncertain student contribution
– A student asked whether the European Union was muted in negotiations and whether it might counterbalance U.S. power compared to Denmark and Greenland.
– Azamat answered that, in his view, the European Union is not fully involved and seems to treat the issue primarily as Denmark’s problem.
– The student followed up by asking whether this limited EU involvement was linked to perceptions that Trump’s remarks about Greenland were merely “cheap talk.”
#### Uncertain student contribution
– A student asked why Azamat chose a **constructivist** explanation rather than a **realist** one.
– Azamat responded that a realist explanation was less convincing because Russian and Chinese activity did not appear significant enough to justify U.S. actions. He viewed U.S. behavior as more about constructed power relations and ownership rhetoric than direct strategic necessity.
#### Uncertain student contribution
– A student asked what evidence supported Azamat’s assessment.
– Azamat responded that his conclusion was based on his point of view and references from February to December/January, but he struggled to identify specific facts.
– The instructor pressed him on which facts led to the conclusion.
– Azamat answered that there were “no facts” in the sense that many statements were rhetorical, such as U.S. or EU claims, rather than confirmed policy actions.
– The instructor noted that this was a bold and philosophically interesting position.
#### Sangmamadova Zamira Marodbekovna
– Asked about Azamat’s low and extreme predictions, including escalation and de-escalation, and which was more likely.
– The instructor clarified that Zamira seemed to be asking for approximate percentages.
– Azamat estimated the likelihood of the status quo/unresolved outcome at roughly **90–100%**.
### 4.6 Instructor Questions and Feedback to Azamat
The instructor asked Azamat two main questions:
#### Baseline Probability
– The instructor asked Azamat to clarify the original **baseline probability** for escalation or continuation of tensions.
– The instructor noted that in forecasting, Azamat needed to:
– Establish a baseline.
– Explain which costs or signals move the probability up or down.
– Show how the final estimate was reached.
– Azamat indicated that the baseline was near zero/almost no-cost but did not provide a fully developed quantitative baseline.
#### Indicators and Warnings
– The instructor asked what indicators and warnings would suggest that the U.S. was about to make a military move against Greenland.
– Azamat initially answered “military actions.”
– The instructor clarified that if troops are already sent to Greenland, that is not a warning signal but the actual outcome.
– The instructor asked for earlier indicators, such as preparatory steps.
– Azamat suggested “cheap talk,” such as statements that troops would be sent.
– The instructor pushed further, explaining that such statements may not be costly signals and that invasion itself is the outcome, not an indicator.
– The instructor ended the questioning to avoid over-pressuring the first presenter and thanked Azamat, noting that being first is difficult.
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## 5. Presentation 2 — Calmettes Zoe: U.S.-Iran Conflict, Ceasefire Extension, and Probability of a Bilateral Agreement
### 5.1 Presentation Overview
– **Presenter:** Calmettes Zoe
– **Topic:** U.S.-Iran conflict, ceasefire extension, failed negotiations, and likelihood of de-escalation leading to a bilateral agreement.
– Zoe presented the situation as one requiring immediate attention.
– She argued that despite failed negotiations, the most likely outcome in the coming year is **de-escalation leading to a bilateral agreement** between the United States and Iran.
### 5.2 Current Situation and Core Facts
– Zoe stated that on **April 22**, President Donald Trump announced the extension of the ceasefire with Iran indefinitely, until Iran submits a proposal and discussions are complete.
– She explained that negotiations in Islamabad/Pakistan had failed the previous week and did not produce an agreement.
– According to Zoe’s scenario:
– Since **February 28**, the U.S. and Israel had been targeting Iran.
– Iran retaliated by targeting U.S. military infrastructure in the region.
– The conflict spread to Iranian proxies, especially:
– Hezbollah in Lebanon.
– Houthis in Yemen.
– Iran used the blockade/closure of the **Strait of Hormuz** as leverage.
– The U.S. imposed a blockade on Iranian ports in response to Iran’s refusal to reopen the strait.
– Zoe identified the **Iranian nuclear issue** as the major cause of negotiation failure.
### 5.3 Causes of the War / Crisis
Zoe identified several drivers:
#### Security Dilemma
– The U.S. sees Iran as a threat, potentially a nuclear threat.
– The U.S. is concerned about threats to:
– Israel, its main regional ally.
– U.S. interests in the region.
#### Iranian Regional Influence
– Iran’s growing influence in the region challenges U.S. power.
– Iranian proxies and allied actors contribute to the broader escalation environment.
#### Window of Opportunity
– Zoe argued that the timing of escalation was shaped by Iran’s vulnerability, including:
– Domestic protests.
– Destruction of part of Iranian nuclear infrastructure during summer 2025.
– Inflation and economic pressure inside Iran.
– These vulnerabilities created an opportunity for U.S./Israeli pressure.
### 5.4 Forecasting Framework and Probability Assessment
– Zoe began with a general baseline:
– The probability of reaching an agreement during an interstate conflict is around **50%**.
– She then adjusted the probability downward and upward based on factors.
#### Factors Driving Probability Down
– **U.S. blockade on Iranian ports**
– Costly factor.
– Reduces likelihood of negotiation because Iran demands lifting the blockade as a condition for talks.
– **Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz**
– Also a costly move.
– Raises international/economic stakes.
– **Disagreement over the nuclear issue**
– Major obstacle to conflict resolution.
– Zoe noted, however, that this disagreement may remain reversible and could become the subject of a future compromise.
#### Factors Driving Probability Up
– **Trump’s extension of the ceasefire**
– Signal in favor of a deal.
– **Trump’s statement that the breakdown of last week’s negotiations does not mean war will resume**
– Interpreted as a peace-oriented signal, though possibly weak given Trump’s unpredictability.
– **White House statement that the U.S. will not use nuclear weapons against Iran**
– Seen as supporting the possibility of agreement.
– **Iranian statements that Iran remains open to negotiations**
– Positive signal.
– **European Union proposal to ease sanctions against Iran**
– Strong signal toward peace.
– **Ceasefire extension between Israel and Lebanon**
– Creates a more favorable regional environment for agreement.
### 5.5 Final Forecast and Conditions for Agreement
– Zoe’s final probability estimate for a bilateral agreement was **64%**, making agreement “likely.”
– Conditions required for an agreement included:
– Mutual concessions on maritime issues.
– Reopening or easing of access related to maritime routes/ports.
– Ending or reducing Iranian support for proxies.
– Easing sanctions on Iran.
– Compromise on the nuclear issue.
– A possible nuclear compromise could include:
– Limits on Iran’s stock of enriched uranium.
– Improved diplomatic and economic cooperation.
– International monitoring, safeguards, and verification.
### 5.6 Q&A: Student Questions and Contributions
#### Baktybekov Azamat Baktybekovich
– Asked why the negotiations failed.
– Zoe explained that the Iranian delegation did not come to Pakistan, and the U.S. then canceled its own trip.
– She said the exact reason was unclear, but suggested Iran’s refusal may have been linked to the continued U.S. blockade on Iranian ports, since Iran made lifting the blockade a condition for negotiation.
#### Jaimes Elena Mary
– Praised Zoe’s thorough use of percentages and costly signals.
– Asked about Trump’s affirmation being assigned only **5%** as a signal.
– Elena asked whether that percentage would be higher with a different leader and whether Trump’s reputation for cheap talk lowered the weight of the signal.
– Zoe agreed that Trump’s unpredictability made the signal less reliable and justified assigning a low percentage.
### 5.7 Instructor Question and Pushback
– The instructor pushed back on the relatively limited weight Zoe gave to Trump’s statements and actions.
– The instructor argued that a useful principle is:
– “Don’t trust what leaders say; trust what they do.”
– The instructor noted that historically, when Trump moves military assets into a region, he tends to use them:
– Venezuela was cited as an example.
– Iran over the summer was cited as another example.
– The instructor asked why Trump’s movement of military assets around Iran did not drag Zoe’s probability of reaching an agreement much lower.
– Zoe responded that contextual factors still supported de-escalation:
– Upcoming midterm elections.
– The Iran war’s unpopularity in the U.S.
– U.S. weapons stock depletion, though she noted she did not include this in the presentation because she lacked strong primary-source evidence.
– Strategic disinterest in continuing the war if negotiations can succeed.
– The instructor accepted the answer and returned to audience questions.
### 5.8 Additional Q&A: Regional and International Impacts
#### Uncertain student contribution
– Asked whether neighboring countries could pressure the U.S. or Iran and influence the probabilities.
– Zoe answered that regional pressure could matter and would likely pressure Iran as well as the U.S.
– She explained that the closure of the Strait of Hormuz affects the global economy, Gulf states, petroleum exports, and inflation.
– She cited Bahrain as having asked Iranian officials to reopen the strait because prices were becoming unsustainable.
– Zoe argued that international economic pressure would push toward agreement.
#### Mamadboqirova Muqaddas Mamadboqirovna
– Asked about Zoe’s sources, especially whether she used both U.S. and Iranian sources.
– Zoe said most of her sources were mainstream media:
– Al Jazeera.
– CNN.
– Reuters.
– French media such as *Le Monde*.
– She also used official White House statements.
– She found some Iranian media but used them cautiously because she could not determine how close they were to the government.
– She acknowledged difficulty finding many Iranian primary sources.
#### Orolova Altynai Sharshenalyevna
– Asked about the impact on Europe and the European Union.
– Zoe answered that Europe was already affected, especially through:
– Gasoline prices.
– Airline and flight route disruptions.
– Increased plane ticket prices.
– Need to repatriate European citizens from the region.
– Zoe emphasized that the crisis already has significant consequences for Europe.
#### Uncertain student contribution
– Asked whether Europe might become militarily involved if the crisis affected Europe and other nations.
– Zoe said she did not think Europe would become militarily involved at this stage.
– She referenced the death of a French soldier involved with UN “blue helmets,” but argued that military intervention would be a major and likely unpopular decision.
– She suggested that current economic effects are not yet sufficient to motivate direct military involvement.
– Zoe said the EU’s current approach is more likely to involve easing sanctions or diplomatic pressure rather than troop deployment.
– She added that European involvement could be perceived as helping the U.S., which may be unpopular given Trump’s recent rhetoric toward Europe.
#### Turdueva Ainazik Muratalievna
– Asked about Israel’s participation in the conflict and its effect on the possibility of agreement.
– Zoe answered that Israel’s bombing of Lebanon and Iran’s defense of Lebanon increased regional tension.
– She argued that the extension of the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire is a costly signal in favor of agreement.
– She explained that if one is negotiating with a party, it is destabilizing if one’s ally is attacking that party’s allies.
– Zoe interpreted Israeli action as part of a broader strategy to pressure Iran through its allies.
#### Sangmamadova Zamira Marodbekovna
– Asked about the situation after the attack on Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the possible role/position of his successor or son, as transcribed.
– Zoe said it was difficult to assess because Khamenei was reportedly injured and not fully leading the country.
– She said the Revolutionary Guard or revolutionary institutions may currently be more important.
– Zoe suggested that if a successor follows Khamenei’s line, they would likely resist allowing the U.S. to “win” the war, but she was uncertain about the exact path.
#### Mamadboqirova Muqaddas Mamadboqirovna — Follow-up
– Asked about regime collapse and whether the former prince/Reza Pahlavi figure might return to Iran and take power.
– Zoe responded that regime collapse is difficult because the Iranian regime is multilayered and not dependent on one individual.
– She emphasized:
– The Revolutionary Guard.
– Multiple institutional levels.
– The persistence of regime remnants even after leadership change.
– Zoe argued that U.S.-backed regime replacement historically does not usually produce immediate stable governance.
– She added that the monarchy was overthrown partly because it was viewed as under U.S. influence, so bringing back a U.S.-aligned figure might still be unacceptable to many Iranians.
– The instructor praised the answer as strong.
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## 6. Presentation 3 — Fontan Hermine Tiphaine Bagdad: Houthi Strikes in the Red Sea and Strategic Disruption of Global Trade
### 6.1 Presentation Setup
– **Presenter:** Fontan Hermine Tiphaine Bagdad
– Hermine experienced technical difficulties sending her presentation.
– The class attempted to use email/transfer methods, and the instructor suggested a flash drive/USB stick.
– The instructor joked about terminology differences around “flash drive” and “USB stick.”
– Hermine eventually began presenting.
### 6.2 Presentation Overview
– **Topic:** Houthi strikes in the Red Sea and their impact on American security, regional escalation, and global trade.
– Hermine’s title framed the Houthis’ actions as a **strategic disruption of global trade**.
– Her bottom-line claim was that:
– The Houthis are deliberately targeting global shipping.
– Their objective is to pressure Israel and gain regional leverage.
– Their pressure on Israel operates indirectly by striking American ships associated with Israel.
– The attacks disrupt Red Sea trade routes for Israel, the U.S., and many other states.
– There is a risk of escalation involving Iran and Western forces.
### 6.3 Evidence of Trade Disruption
– Hermine showed a graph comparing expected freight container volumes in the Red Sea to actual freight after the attacks.
– The graph indicated:
– The red line represented expected freight.
– The blue line represented actual freight after Houthi attacks.
– Actual freight was much lower than expected, showing a major disruption.
– She emphasized that the impact on shipping volumes was “really huge.”
### 6.4 Current Situation and Geographic Focus
– Hermine described ongoing:
– Missile strikes.
– Drone strikes.
– Attacks on vessels, including American and Israeli-linked vessels.
– She identified the **Bab el-Mandeb choke point** as the central location of concern.
– Because of the danger in the Red Sea, ships are forced to reroute around the **Cape of Good Hope**.
– Hermine explained that this deviation adds roughly **6,000 nautical miles**, creating:
– Major costs.
– Delays.
– Commercial inconvenience.
– Expanded naval presence.
– Increased rerouting by commercial actors.
### 6.5 Signals and Evidence
Hermine identified several observed signals:
– Clear link to Israel-associated shipping.
– U.S. ships targeted because of perceived association with Israel.
– Use of advanced drones and anti-ship missiles.
– Messaging tied explicitly to the Gaza conflict.
– Houthi statements indicating that attacks will continue as long as Israel continues striking Palestine/Gaza.
– Increasing frequency and range of attacks.
– Uncertainty around Houthi funding and capacity, since their ability to sustain attacks remains somewhat mysterious.
### 6.6 Constructivist Interpretation
– Hermine used a constructivist lens.
– She argued that actions are shaped by:
– Identity.
– Ideology.
– Perceptions of actors.
– The Houthis perceive Israel and the U.S. as enemies or “bad guys.”
– Their attacks function as symbolic signaling.
– The narrative is one of resistance and defense of Gaza.
– Hermine also considered how the U.S. perceives itself:
– As a powerful nation that will not tolerate these attacks.
– This identity creates pressure for a U.S. response.
### 6.7 Status-Seeking Behavior
– Hermine argued that the Houthis are shifting from a local militia role toward a regional actor role.
– Their visibility increases because they can disrupt global trade.
– This disruption gives them status through recognition.
– Their relationship to the Iran-aligned network matters because they compete or operate within that broader regional axis.
### 6.8 Scenario-Based Forecasting
Hermine offered three possible scenarios:
#### Scenario 1 — Status Quo / Controlled Signaling
– Most likely scenario.
– Continued targeting and attacks.
– Stable disruption without full-scale escalation.
– Signals supporting this:
– Attack frequency is increasing but remains part of an ongoing campaign.
– Targeting is still somewhat restrained.
– The Houthis continue signaling rather than moving into full regional war.
#### Scenario 2 — Escalation
– Estimated probability: **20–30%**
– Could involve:
– Broader targeting.
– Direct clashes.
– Additional Iranian involvement.
– Signals supporting escalation:
– Risk of accidental clash.
– Expanding attack range.
– Hermine kept this probability relatively low because actors still appear to be avoiding full war.
#### Scenario 3 — De-escalation
– Estimated probability: **10–15%**
– Would involve:
– Reduced attacks.
– Diplomatic signals.
– Decreased Iranian involvement or funding.
– Hermine noted this would be more likely if Iran redirected attention and funding toward its own defense, especially amid its own conflicts.
– However, she emphasized that:
– There have been no strong negotiation signals in three years.
– Houthi messaging remains aggressive.
– The Houthis have strong incentives to continue signaling.
### 6.9 Final Assessment
– Hermine concluded that sustained controlled disruption is the most likely outcome.
– She warned of a high risk of miscalculation.
– She emphasized that the conflict is driven by:
– Signaling.
– Identity.
– Ideology.
– Status-seeking behavior.
### 6.10 Instructor Question to Hermine
– The instructor asked Hermine to clarify what “escalation” meant in her forecast.
– Hermine explained that escalation would primarily mean direct clashes.
– She elaborated:
– The Houthis continue attacking U.S. ships.
– Their range is expanding.
– The Red Sea/Bab el-Mandeb area is narrow and crowded.
– There is a real risk of attacking the wrong ship or triggering an accidental clash.
– A full war remains unlikely because actors still avoid that outcome.
– However, if the U.S. becomes extremely irritated and responds more aggressively, escalation could occur.
### 6.11 Q&A: Student Questions and Contributions
#### Mamadboqirova Muqaddas Mamadboqirovna
– Asked about the current regional situation and its impact on Houthi activity.
– Specifically asked whether the Houthis may be becoming more independent actors rather than relying on Iranian direction or support.
– Hermine answered that there are not many clear cues:
– The Houthis remain very quiet publicly.
– Their only major messaging continues to relate to Gaza.
– There has not been a dramatic increase or decrease in attacks since the Iran situation began.
– Their activity has continued in a stable pattern of increase over three years.
– Hermine said Iran does not have unlimited funds, so the Houthis may eventually seek resources elsewhere, but the funding situation is opaque.
#### Calmettes Zoe
– Asked how a potential U.S.-Iran agreement could affect the possible trajectories of the Red Sea/Houthi situation.
– Hermine answered that such an agreement could significantly affect the Houthis if it led Iran to reduce or withdraw funding.
– She reasoned that if Iran signs a peace agreement with the U.S., it would make less sense for Iran to fund attacks on U.S. ships.
– However, she cautioned that it is unclear whether the Houthis receive all their funding from Iran.
– If they have other funding sources, a U.S.-Iran agreement might not stop the attacks.
#### Jaimes Elena Mary
– Asked whether the Houthis are targeting global shipping mainly because of allegiance to Palestine/Gaza and whether the attacks are a response to Israel’s actions.
– Hermine answered that the Houthis have made only a few official statements over three years, and those statements have been uniquely tied to Gaza.
– She quoted the logic of their message as:
– They will not stop until Israel stops attacking Palestine/Gaza.
– Hermine concluded that the available open signals strongly indicate the attacks are linked to Gaza and intended to pressure Israel.
#### De Wever Sophie Louise
– Asked whether, if the Houthis gain more influence in the region, they could become more than a terrorist group or militia and take on a more authoritative role controlling seas or land.
– Hermine said it was possible but not very likely.
– She argued that the Houthis do not currently seem focused on seeking territorial or institutional authority beyond their current campaign.
– Their known behavior appears more ideology-driven than power-expansion-driven.
– Hermine assessed this as a low-probability outcome.
#### Uncertain student contribution
– Asked about the actions or effectiveness of other political/international organizations, likely including the UN.
– Hermine said international organizations hold discussions and conferences about the issue.
– She referenced UN-related talks about the conflict.
– However, she emphasized that there is more talk than action and limited observable effect so far.
#### Sangmamadova Zamira Marodbekovna
– Asked about the impact on Gulf countries and whether there is clear evidence that they are doing something to stop the attacks, including possible negotiations with the U.S.
– Hermine answered that Gulf countries have voiced support toward the U.S., but, similar to the UN, there has been more talk than concrete action.
– She said it is plausible that Gulf states may eventually provide military support to the U.S. if escalation continues.
– However, she also noted that because the conflict has already lasted three years, one could argue that if regional powers intended to intervene decisively, they might have done so already.
—
## 7. End-of-Class Logistics and Deferred Presentation
– The instructor noted that the class had run out of time.
– Although four presentations were scheduled, only three were completed:
1. Baktybekov Azamat Baktybekovich
2. Calmettes Zoe
3. Fontan Hermine Tiphaine Bagdad
– The fourth presentation was postponed to the next class.
– The instructor announced that on Thursday, the class would begin **promptly at 12:45**.
– Students were asked to be on time because it would be the **last class**.
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## 8. Submission and Presentation File Logistics
– A student asked whether presentations should be submitted on e-course.
– The instructor said there should be a place on e-course for submissions and that submitting on time would allow the instructor to download files together and open them efficiently.
– Later clarification:
– For students who presented that day, the instructor asked them to email their presentation files directly.
– Acceptable formats included:
– PPT
– PDF
– Other presentation slide files
– Another student said they could not find the place to upload the presentation.
– The instructor clarified:
– For presentation files, there may not be a submission box.
– Students should email the files directly to the instructor.
—
# Student Tracker
– **Baktybekov Azamat Baktybekovich**
– Presented on U.S.-Greenland/Denmark tensions, arguing that U.S. behavior is best explained by constructivist hierarchy/ownership logic rather than pure strategic materialism; answered questions on escalation likelihood, NATO implications, EU involvement, evidence, and indicators/warnings.
– **Mamadboqirova Muqaddas Mamadboqirovna**
– Asked Azamat about status quo versus escalation; asked Zoe about source selection and Iranian/U.S. sources; asked Hermine about whether the Houthis are becoming more independent from Iran.
– **Calmettes Zoe**
– Presented on U.S.-Iran conflict and argued that de-escalation leading to a bilateral agreement is likely; used probability adjustments, costly/cheap signals, and conditions for agreement; also asked Azamat about NATO/European responses and asked Hermine about the effect of a U.S.-Iran agreement on Houthi behavior.
– **Orolova Altynai Sharshenalyevna**
– Asked Azamat to quantify the strength of his competing diagnostics and asked Zoe about the impact of the Iran crisis on Europe and the EU.
– **Jaimes Elena Mary**
– Asked Azamat about Russian and Chinese interests in Greenland/the Arctic; asked Zoe about whether Trump’s unpredictability should reduce the weight of his statements as signals; asked Hermine whether Houthi attacks are primarily motivated by allegiance to Gaza/Palestine.
– **Turdueva Ainazik Muratalievna**
– Asked Zoe about Israel’s participation in the conflict and how Israel’s actions affect the likelihood of U.S.-Iran agreement.
– **Sangmamadova Zamira Marodbekovna**
– Asked Azamat about probabilities for escalation/de-escalation; asked Zoe about Iranian leadership succession and regime-change possibilities; asked Hermine about Gulf state responses and whether they are taking steps to stop the Red Sea attacks.
– **Fontan Hermine Tiphaine Bagdad**
– Presented on Houthi strikes in the Red Sea, emphasizing trade disruption, Bab el-Mandeb/Cape of Good Hope rerouting, constructivist signaling, status-seeking, and scenario forecasts.
– **De Wever Sophie Louise**
– Asked Hermine whether growing Houthi influence could turn them into a more authoritative regional actor controlling seas or land.
– **Uncertain student**
– Asked Azamat about EU involvement and whether Europe could counterbalance U.S. pressure on Denmark/Greenland.
– **Uncertain student**
– Asked Azamat why he chose a constructivist rather than realist explanation.
– **Uncertain student**
– Asked Azamat what evidence supported his assessment and which resources/facts led to his point of view.
– **Uncertain student**
– Asked Zoe about whether neighboring countries could pressure the U.S. or Iran and influence probabilities of agreement.
– **Uncertain student**
– Asked Zoe whether Europe could become militarily involved due to the regional and economic effects of the conflict.
– **Uncertain student**
– Asked Hermine about the role and effectiveness of international/political organizations such as the UN.
—
# Actionable Items
## Urgent — Before/At Next Class
– Begin the next class promptly at **12:45 on Thursday**.
– Ensure remaining presenters are ready to present immediately because Thursday is the **last class**.
– Make time for the postponed fourth presentation from this session.
– Confirm who was scheduled as the fourth presenter and whether any documentation/Spravka affects presentation timing or grading.
## Student Submission Follow-Up
– Students who presented today should **email their presentation slides** to the instructor.
– Accepted formats: **PPT, PDF, or equivalent slide file**.
– Clarify to students whether presentation files should be emailed or uploaded to e-course, since there was confusion about the submission box.
## Instructor Follow-Up / Assessment Notes
– Azamat may need feedback on:
– Establishing and stating a clear baseline probability.
– Distinguishing indicators/warnings from the outcome itself.
– Identifying concrete evidence supporting analytical claims.
– Zoe’s presentation showed strong use of probability logic, but the instructor may want to revisit:
– How military deployments should affect probability estimates.
– How to weigh leader statements versus actions.
– Hermine’s presentation clearly structured scenarios, but future feedback could focus on:
– Defining escalation thresholds precisely.
– Clarifying evidence for Houthi funding sources and Iranian control/influence.
Homework Instructions:
ASSIGNMENT #1: Submit Your Intelligence Briefing Presentation Slides
You should submit the slides from the intelligence briefing presentation you delivered in class today. This allows the instructor to collect the materials from the presentations and keep a record of the evidence, forecasts, scenarios, and analytical claims you presented to the class.
Instructions:
1. If you presented your intelligence briefing in class today, locate the final version of the presentation file you used.
– This may be a PowerPoint file, PDF, or any other slide format you presented from.
– The instructor specifically said that “PPT files, PDF, whatever it was” are acceptable.
2. Make sure your file is the version you actually presented in class.
– Your slides should reflect the intelligence briefing you delivered, including your bottom-line-up-front statement, core facts, diagnostics or theoretical framework, probability estimates, indicators/signals, scenarios, and final assessment where applicable.
– You do not need to create a new presentation unless you want to correct formatting or make sure the file opens properly.
3. Email the presentation file directly to the instructor.
– The instructor clarified that there is not a separate submission box for the presentations and that you should send the file by email.
– Do not worry about submitting the slides through eCourse unless the instructor later creates a specific submission location.
4. In your email, include a clear subject line so the instructor can easily identify your file.
– Suggested subject line: “Intelligence Briefing Slides – [Your Name]”
– Example: “Intelligence Briefing Slides – Azamat”
5. Attach the presentation file to the email before sending it.
– Double-check that the attachment is included and that the file opens correctly.
– If your file is very large, save or export it as a PDF and send that version instead.
6. Send the email as soon as possible after class.
– The instructor asked presenters to send the slides after the presentations and confirmed that emailing the files is sufficient.