Lesson Report:
# Forecasting Foundations: Probability, Adversaries, and Cost-Based Prediction
This session marked the class’s clear transition from explaining past events to forecasting future political behavior. The instructor reviewed the language of probability, introduced the logic of mapping outcomes and costs, and used game-theory-style examples to help students practice predicting how states act when faced with adversaries, tradeoffs, and escalation risks.
## Attendance
– **Students explicitly mentioned absent:** **0**
– **Absent names mentioned:** None
– **Additional note:** **Muqaddas Mamadboqirova** was mentioned as having left the room during discussion, but she was **not explicitly recorded as absent**.
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## Topics Covered
### 1. Opening remarks and administrative reminders: transition into forecasting
– The instructor opened with informal remarks and then framed the week’s objective: the course is now moving from discussing **what happened and why** to discussing **what is likely to happen next**.
– The instructor emphasized that the goal is to make predictions in an **academic, professional, analytically grounded** way rather than “guesstimating.”
– A major administrative announcement concerned the **midterm**:
– Students who submitted it were thanked.
– Students who had **not yet submitted** were strongly reminded to do so.
– Final deadline: **Thursday at 23:59**.
– Without submission by that deadline, and **without a spravka**, a student would **not be able to pass the class**.
– Late credit was still possible up to that deadline.
– Submitted midterms were expected to be graded and returned in **about two weeks**.
### 2. Review of previous class: what makes political prediction difficult
– The lesson began with a review of Thursday’s key concept: **prediction**.
– The instructor reminded students that in politics and international relations, prediction is “a delicate affair” because analysts cannot present uncertain future events as certainties.
– The class revisited the example statement: **“China will invade Taiwan.”**
– The instructor asked why this is not acceptable professional analytical language.
– An **uncertain student** noted the issue of **probability**.
– The instructor clarified that saying something **“will” happen** implies **100% certainty**, which analysts are not equipped to claim.
– The instructor reviewed the principle that forecasting should be expressed in terms of **likelihood/probability**, not certainty:
– “Very likely”
– “Likely”
– “Unlikely”
– “Very unlikely”
– The core “golden rule” was restated:
– Analysts should **not say an event has a 100% chance of happening**
– Analysts should **not say an event has a 0% chance of happening**
– There is always some degree of uncertainty either way
### 3. Prediction models introduced: game theory, bargaining theory, and the need to explain state behavior
– The instructor reviewed the broader question behind forecasting: **Why do states do what they do?**
– A distinction was drawn between:
– explaining past state behavior, which is easier because actions have already occurred, and
– explaining future behavior, which is much harder because it depends on incentives, choices, and uncertainty.
– The class revisited models such as:
– **game theory**
– **bargaining theory**
– **the prisoner’s dilemma**
– These models were presented as tools for understanding what actors are likely to do under different strategic circumstances.
### 4. Foundational analytical step: “mapping the outcomes”
– Before using formal prediction models, the instructor emphasized the first fundamental step: **mapping the outcomes**.
– The class paused to define terms:
– An **outcome** = the **result** of a situation or event.
– To **map the outcomes** = to identify all plausible outcomes and consider their consequences.
– An **uncertain student** described this as asking **what could happen and what the consequences would be**, which the instructor affirmed.
– The instructor stressed that analysts must first list all plausible outcomes **before** trying to judge which one is most likely.
### 5. Truck-road analogy: one-lane road as a model for strategic interaction
– To illustrate outcome mapping, the instructor returned to the prior class’s example of **two truck drivers approaching each other on a stretch of road too narrow for both to pass simultaneously**.
– The scenario was framed as a stylized model of conflict and choice under pressure.
– Students helped identify the possible immediate outcomes:
– **Both drivers pull off the road**
– **One driver pulls off while the other continues**
– **The reverse version of the above**
– **Neither yields and both collide**
– **Hermine Fontan** asked whether **both drivers could pull off to the side**, which helped open the discussion of alternative outcomes.
– Several **uncertain students** contributed possibilities such as:
– one driver yielding while the other continues,
– both crashing,
– and later secondary consequences such as conflict after stopping.
– The instructor clarified the distinction between:
– **primary/immediate outcomes** of the confrontation, and
– **later downstream developments** such as arguing, fighting, or becoming cooperative afterward.
### 6. From outcomes to conditions: what has to happen for an outcome to occur?
– After listing outcomes, the instructor moved to the next analytical question:
– **What would need to happen for each outcome to occur?**
– What are the **prerequisites** or **factors** that produce one outcome instead of another?
– This shifted the class from merely listing options to analyzing **causal conditions**.
– Students were pushed to move beyond “what could happen” into “under what conditions would it happen?”
### 7. Commitment and signaling: the “ripping out the steering wheel” example
– **Hermine Fontan** recalled the earlier example in which one truck driver **rips out his steering wheel**, making it impossible for himself to steer away.
– The instructor used this to introduce the logic of **signaling** and **visible commitment**, previewing material for next week.
– Key distinction:
– If a driver removes the steering wheel **and the other driver sees it**, the other driver realizes that the first has **no option** but to continue.
– If the steering wheel is removed **but hidden from view**, the opponent does not update their calculation in the same way.
– The class drew out the key lesson:
– It is not enough to have no option;
– what matters strategically is whether the opponent **knows** you have no option.
– This was framed as one of the central paradoxes of strategic behavior: actors can shape outcomes by **visibly constraining themselves**.
### 8. Thinking like both sides: analyst mindset and chess analogy
– The instructor then broadened the lesson from trucks to statecraft.
– Students were told that forecasting requires occupying the perspective of:
– the actor of interest, and
– the actor’s adversary.
– Using **chess** as an analogy, the instructor explained that successful strategy depends not only on planning one’s own next move, but also on anticipating:
– what the opponent will do next,
– how they interpret your move,
– and how to leave them with the least advantageous set of options.
– This framed the next classroom activity: students would use their own midterm topics to practice adversarial perspective-taking.
### 9. Applied class activity: identifying the main actor and adversary from midterm topics
– Students were asked to take out their **midterm work**, specifically the **dependent variable** they had developed.
– They were instructed to identify:
– the **main actor** in their case, and
– that actor’s **primary adversary** in the situation.
– The instructor used **China and Taiwan** as the model:
– if the dependent variable concerns China’s military actions around Taiwan,
– the likely adversary could be **Taiwan** or potentially the **United States**.
– Students were given time to write the adversary below their dependent variable.
### 10. Applied forecasting exercise: three adversary-perspective questions
Students were then asked to answer three questions **from the adversary’s perspective**, without using internet resources:
1. **What is the worst-case scenario for you right now?**
2. **What is the ideal outcome for you?**
3. **What are you most afraid of losing if you respond too aggressively?**
– The instructor emphasized that this was meant to develop the ability to predict behavior by understanding what the adversary fears, values, and wants to avoid.
### 11. Student example: Elena on China/Taiwan
– **Elena Mary Jaimes** volunteered first.
– Her case used **Taiwan as the adversary**.
– Her responses:
– **Worst-case scenario:** China builds up a highly organized, powerful military capable of **invading or blockading Taiwan**.
– **Ideal outcome:** China **stops military drills** and **recognizes Taiwan’s sovereignty and independence**.
– **Main fear if Taiwan responds too aggressively:** China could interpret defensive moves as an **act of war**, then use that interpretation to justify **invasion or blockade**.
– The instructor used Elena’s answer to expand discussion of what “military drills” around Taiwan can include:
– **airspace incursions**
– **naval patrols**
– **joint combat exercises**
– drone activity near the area
– The class then unpacked why the location matters:
– Taiwan is an **island**
– control over surrounding waters affects **sovereignty**, **access**, **trade**, and the ability to keep other actors out
– An **uncertain student** helped explain that control over these waters matters because it affects **shipping access and trade routes**.
– The instructor then analyzed why China positions vessels near the boundary of Taiwan’s waters:
– to project **dominance**
– to test limits
– to provoke uncertainty
– to show readiness to act without fully crossing into open war
– The instructor highlighted how a small crossing or near-crossing invites a dilemma:
– if Taiwan reacts militarily, it risks escalation;
– if it does not, China demonstrates freedom of action.
– This example was used to reinforce the idea that response choices are shaped by **costs**, especially the cost of a larger war.
### 12. Student example: Houthis, U.S., and Iran in the Red Sea
– An **uncertain student** raised a case involving the **Houthis**, the **United States**, and the **Red Sea**.
– The student’s reasoning included:
– a **worst-case scenario** in which Iran increases support for the Houthis, creating a much larger problem for the U.S. and potentially forcing stronger retaliation;
– concern that an overly aggressive U.S. response could affect a major maritime route used by many countries;
– recognition that escalation could create a broader international conflict and damage the **global economy**;
– an **ideal outcome** in which Iran stops funding the Houthis, causing the movement to weaken materially.
– The instructor used this example to push the class toward cost analysis:
– If the Houthis are weaker than the U.S. militarily, why doesn’t the U.S. simply destroy them through overwhelming force?
– The class discussed several costs:
– escalation
– disruption of a key trade corridor
– involvement of additional states
– large civilian casualties
– domestic political backlash
– the possibility of having to send troops, not just bombs
– The instructor summarized that even when military victory seems technically possible, it may still be politically and economically too costly.
### 13. Student example: Sophie on Iran and the U.S.
– **Sophie Louise De Wever** then volunteered an Iran-focused example.
– Her framing:
– **Main actor:** the United States
– **Other side / adversary perspective:** Iran
– Her responses:
– **Worst-case scenario for Iran:** a **full-scale U.S. invasion**, including armed military intervention and boots on the ground.
– **Ideal outcome for Iran:** reaching a **deal** that ends hostilities while allowing Iran to **keep its regime**.
– **Main fear if Iran responds too aggressively:** escalation could snowball, leading the U.S. to become even more forceful and potentially **replace the regime**.
– The instructor used Sophie’s answer to interpret Iran’s public rhetoric.
– Students were asked what Iran has been saying about possible U.S. invasion; the instructor noted that Iran’s messaging has not been submissive but instead has projected defiance, essentially: **“We’re waiting for you.”**
– This was used to ask why a state facing very high costs would still publicly sound combative.
### 14. Hermine’s contribution on deterrence through uncertainty
– **Hermine Fontan** suggested that if she were the U.S. hearing such rhetoric from Iran, she might suspect that Iran knows or possesses something not fully visible to outsiders.
– She referenced the uncertainty surrounding Iran’s capabilities and argued that such messaging could be **disconcerting** because it raises the possibility of hidden strength or unknown risk.
– The instructor affirmed this insight and connected it back to signaling:
– public bravado can make a state appear **less weak**
– it can increase the opponent’s uncertainty
– it can make intervention appear more costly or risky than before
### 15. Core conceptual takeaway: costs matter more than raw possibilities
– The instructor formalized the day’s main forecasting principle:
– Analysts should evaluate outcomes in terms of **costs**
– More importantly, they must evaluate what the actors **believe** the costs are
– The instructor stressed that objective reality matters less for immediate decision-making than **perceived cost**.
– Example:
– If the U.S. believes Iran is weak, invasion may seem easier and cheaper.
– If Iran can make the U.S. believe invasion would be costly, risky, unpopular, and dangerous, that alters U.S. behavior.
– The instructor also stressed the domestic political dimension:
– states are not only calculating battlefield outcomes;
– they are calculating public reaction, electoral consequences, prestige, and long-term strategic fallout.
### 16. Acting vs not acting: the Iran example as full cost-benefit analysis
– The instructor concluded the conceptual section by comparing:
– the **cost of acting** and
– the **cost of not acting**
– Using Iran’s rhetoric toward the U.S. as the main example:
– **Cost of not acting / saying nothing:** Iran looks weak; that weakness may make invasion seem more attractive to the U.S.
– **Cost of acting / sounding defiant:** the U.S. might still invade, and the gamble could backfire.
– Iran’s apparent choice to project strength was explained as a judgment that:
– the cost of **appearing weak** was higher than the cost of **projecting defiance**
– This led to the general forecasting rule for the course:
– when forced to choose, a state will usually choose the option it believes is **least costly**
– forecasting means identifying which option the actor sees that way
### 17. Final in-class writing task: outcome-cost lists for each student’s case
– For the last activity, students were instructed to:
– list **at least two possible outcomes** for their dependent variable,
– and identify the **costs** associated with each outcome.
– The goal was to connect the day’s theory to each student’s research topic and prepare for further work on decision-mapping.
### 18. Closing and homework
– The instructor said students would **share what they wrote at the beginning of Thursday’s class**.
– Homework assigned:
– a **short 10-page reading from Schelling** on e-course
– students were specifically asked to focus on **the “paradox of weakness”**
– Final reminder:
– any student still missing the midterm must submit it **before Thursday night** in order to remain eligible to pass the class.
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## Student Tracker
– **Elena Mary Jaimes** — Volunteered a detailed Taiwan-perspective analysis of China’s military drills, identifying invasion/blockade as the worst case and escalation risk as the major danger of an overly aggressive response.
– **Hermine Fontan** — Contributed repeatedly by asking whether both trucks could yield, recalling the steering-wheel example, and later suggesting that Iran’s rhetoric may work by creating fear of hidden capabilities and uncertainty.
– **Sophie Louise De Wever** — Presented an Iran-perspective analysis in which full U.S. invasion was the worst case and regime survival through a deal was the ideal outcome.
– **Muqaddas Mamadboqirova** — Mentioned only in passing when the instructor noted she had left the room; no academic contribution was captured in the transcript.
– **Uncertain student(s)** — Contributed brief answers on probability, defining outcomes, listing truck-road scenario possibilities, explaining Taiwan’s maritime/trade concerns, and discussing U.S.-Houthi-Iran escalation in the Red Sea.
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## Actionable Items
### High Priority
– Follow up with any students who still have **not submitted the midterm**.
– Reinforce that the **midterm deadline is Thursday at 23:59**.
– Note that, **without a spravka**, failure to submit the midterm means the student **cannot pass the class**.
### Next Class Preparation
– Begin Thursday by having students **share their adversary-perspective and outcome-cost notes** from today’s in-class exercise.
– Continue from today’s lesson into **mapping options and forecasting decisions**.
– Build directly into next topic: **signaling** and the **paradox of weakness**.
### Course Materials / Homework
– Ensure the **10-page Schelling reading** is posted/available on e-course.
– Remind students to focus especially on **the paradox of weakness** before Thursday.
### Assessment / Administrative Follow-Up
– Midterms already submitted should be **graded and returned within approximately two weeks**.
Homework Instructions:
ASSIGNMENT #1: Read the Schelling excerpt on the paradox of weakness
You will complete a short reading posted tonight so that you are prepared to continue our move from explaining past events to forecasting future state behavior. This reading is meant to deepen your understanding of how actors make decisions based on costs, risks, adversaries’ perceptions, and the “paradox of weakness” that we discussed through the truck example and the cases involving China/Taiwan, the Houthis, and Iran.
Instructions:
1. Go to the course page and locate the short reading from Schelling that will be posted tonight.
2. Read through the full 10-page excerpt.
3. As you read, pay special attention to the idea of the paradox of weakness.
4. Connect the reading to the example from class in which one truck driver throws the steering wheel out the window. As you review that example, think about why showing that you have limited options can force the other actor to respond.
5. Keep in mind the broader forecasting framework from class:
1. map the possible outcomes,
2. identify best-case and worst-case scenarios,
3. consider what each actor is afraid of losing,
4. evaluate the costs of acting versus not acting.
6. While reading, make brief notes on how the paradox of weakness affects an adversary’s calculations. In particular, think about how an actor may try to look dangerous, committed, or unable to back down in order to change the opponent’s behavior.
7. Review the class examples as you read:
1. China’s military drills around Taiwan,
2. U.S. and Iranian decision-making,
3. the logic of threats, escalation, and perceived costs.
8. Come to class on Thursday ready to discuss the reading and apply it to forecasting political outcomes.