Lesson Report:
# Lesson Report: Final Conflict Forecasting Presentations — Greenland, Taiwan, and Iran Crisis Assessments
## Title & Synopsis
**Final Forecasting Briefings on Arctic, Taiwan Strait, and Iran Conflict Scenarios**
This session was devoted to final student presentations applying conflict-analysis and forecasting tools to current international security cases. Students delivered timed five-minute briefings, followed by peer and instructor questions focusing on baselines, costly signals vs. cheap talk, escalation/de-escalation pathways, and probability assignments for future scenarios.
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## Attendance
### Identified Students Present / Participating
– **Turdueva Ainazik Muratalievna**
– **Sangmamadova Zamira Marodbekovna**
– **Mamadboqirova Muqaddas Mamadboqirovna**
– **De Wever Sophie Louise**
– **Orolova Altynai Sharshenalyevna**
– **Jaimes Elena Mary**
– **Baktybekov Azamat Baktybekovich**
### Students Mentioned Absent or Not Present
– **Wyatt Adam James** — explicitly noted as not being present; instructor and students discussed that he had not appeared and seemed to be busy with other program obligations.
### Number of Students Explicitly Mentioned Absent
– **1 confirmed absent / not present by mention:** Wyatt Adam James
### Attendance Notes
– At the start of class, the instructor noted that only a few students were present and that the class would begin despite many people not yet having arrived.
– Several students arrived or were present by the time Q&A and later presentations occurred.
– No definitive attendance status was established in the transcript for students not mentioned by name.
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## Topics Covered
### 1. Opening Logistics and Presentation Order
– The instructor opened by noting that **two students still needed to present** and asked whether **Turdueva Ainazik Muratalievna** or **Sangmamadova Zamira Marodbekovna** wanted to go first.
– The instructor asked **Ainazik** to email her presentation file so it could be projected.
– The instructor also asked **Zamira** to send her presentation file in advance to speed up the transition.
– Because attendance was low at the beginning, the instructor stated that the class would have to begin with only a few people present.
– The instructor reminded presenters that each briefing needed to stay within a **strict five-minute limit** to avoid running overtime.
– A timer was set for each presentation.
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### 2. Presentation 1 — Turdueva Ainazik Muratalievna: Greenland, U.S. Pressure, and Arctic Sovereignty
**Presenter:** Turdueva Ainazik Muratalievna
**Case:** Greenland / United States / Denmark / NATO / Arctic security
**Main Objective:** Assess whether U.S. pressure over Greenland could lead to a sovereignty crisis, military coercion, or continuation of the status quo.
#### Core Argument and Bottom Line
– Ainazik argued that the most likely outcome is continuation of the **status quo**, with Greenland remaining under Danish sovereignty.
– She estimated the status quo scenario at approximately **75% likelihood**.
– She argued that although U.S. pressure may continue, outright sovereignty change or invasion is unlikely.
– She framed the case around U.S. interest in Greenland due to its strategic Arctic location, military value, and relevance to competition with Russia and China.
#### Ground Truth and Timeline of Events
Ainazik presented a timeline of relevant developments:
– **January 2026:** Greenland’s government stated that Greenland is **not for sale**, reaffirming its sovereignty and rejecting U.S. ownership claims.
– **Trump’s remarks:** Ainazik discussed statements by Donald Trump suggesting that the United States had a right or strategic need to take ownership or control of Greenland.
– **Tariffs / trade pressure:** She mentioned that Trump began imposing tariffs or import measures affecting multiple countries, although the transcript was unclear on exact details.
– **February 2026:** NATO launched an Arctic security initiative in response to increased Russian and Chinese activity in the Arctic region.
– **March 2026:** NATO conducted a large Arctic military exercise involving approximately **25,000 troops from 14 nations**.
– **April 2026:** Greenland’s prime minister rejected or responded to Trump’s remarks and called for NATO solidarity. A new foreign minister was appointed to handle U.S.-related tensions.
#### Theoretical Frameworks
Ainazik applied two international relations theories:
##### Realism
– From a realist perspective, she argued that the United States seeks control or influence over Greenland because of its **strategic value in the Arctic**.
– Greenland provides:
– Early-warning capabilities.
– Access to sea lanes.
– Potential military basing advantages.
– Strategic positioning relative to Russia and China.
– She treated Trump’s rhetoric about ownership as a realist attempt to strengthen U.S. geopolitical advantage and prevent rivals from gaining influence in the Arctic.
– She referenced commentary suggesting that Greenland’s location directly affects **NATO security**.
##### Constructivism
– From a constructivist perspective, she argued that the dispute is also about **identity, sovereignty, and self-determination**.
– Trump’s framing treats Greenland as an object that can be owned for security purposes.
– Greenland and Denmark instead emphasize:
– Greenlandic self-determination.
– Sovereignty.
– Territorial integrity.
– International legal norms.
– Ainazik argued that U.S. rhetoric challenges norms of territorial integrity and sovereignty, which Greenland and Denmark strongly defend.
#### Forecasting Scenarios
Ainazik offered two main forecasting pathways:
##### Scenario 1: Status Quo Continues — 75%
– Greenland remains under Danish sovereignty.
– The United States continues diplomatic pressure and military presence in the Arctic.
– NATO manages tensions through security cooperation and Arctic initiatives.
– This was her primary forecast.
##### Scenario 2: Escalation / Coercion — 25%
– The United States could use military or political coercion, such as:
– Increased pressure on Greenland.
– Aggressive control attempts.
– Attempts to bypass Greenlandic sovereignty.
– This could produce greater NATO tension and political instability.
#### Indicators and Warnings
Ainazik identified warning signs that would suggest movement away from the status quo:
– U.S. announcements directly challenging Greenlandic sovereignty.
– U.S. legal or treaty proposals concerning sovereignty beyond normal security cooperation.
– Tensions within NATO over Arctic policy.
– Expansion of U.S. military needs or political influence in Greenland.
– Weakening Danish or Greenlandic resistance to U.S. pressure.
#### Q&A and Discussion
##### Question from Jaimes Elena Mary
– Elena asked about the **March 2026 NATO exercise** involving 25,000 troops.
– She asked what the purpose of the exercise was and what NATO was trying to signal either to the United States or to Greenland.
– Ainazik responded that the exercise was related to defense preparedness and the protection of territory in the Arctic, though the transcript was partially unclear.
##### Question from Baktybekov Azamat Baktybekovich
– Azamat asked about one of Ainazik’s warning slides and wanted clarification on how she viewed the situation.
– He raised the possibility of internal struggles or crises between Denmark and Greenland and asked whether NATO’s external role would affect the situation.
– The instructor noted that this was an interesting question.
##### Question from De Wever Sophie Louise
– Sophie connected Ainazik’s Greenland case to her own Iran case.
– She asked whether events in Iran might influence the Greenland situation by shifting U.S. attention and focus.
– Ainazik responded that Iran is likely a higher priority for the United States than Greenland.
– However, she suggested that if U.S. policy succeeds in Iran, the United States may later turn more attention back to Greenland.
##### Instructor Question on Baselines
– The instructor asked Ainazik to clarify her **baseline**.
– Specifically, he asked where the 75% estimate came from and what the baseline probability was for the main outcome being measured.
– The instructor clarified that the relevant outcome seemed to be whether the United States actually does something coercive or invasive in Greenland.
– Ainazik’s answer was unclear in the transcript, but she seemed to suggest that the baseline was grounded in the long historical status quo of Greenland remaining under Danish authority and no other state acting to take it.
##### Instructor Feedback
– The instructor thanked Ainazik for presenting first.
– He noted that the presentation was well timed and praised the presentation overall.
—
### 3. Presentation 2 — Sangmamadova Zamira Marodbekovna: Chinese Military Pressure Around Taiwan
**Presenter:** Sangmamadova Zamira Marodbekovna
**Case:** China-Taiwan military drills and escalation risks
**Main Objective:** Analyze China’s increasing military presence near Taiwan and assess whether it represents cheap talk, costly signaling, deterrence, or preparation for escalation.
#### Core Argument and Bottom Line
– Zamira argued that China has significantly increased its military presence around Taiwan over the past two to three years.
– She stated that in **2025**, Chinese military assets were near Taiwan for approximately **360 out of 365 days**, indicating a sustained pattern of pressure.
– Her central claim was that China’s military actions have shifted from rhetorical statements and cheap talk toward **costly signaling**.
– She forecasted that in the next three to six months China would likely continue gradual escalation through exercises and symbolic pressure, but not launch a full invasion.
#### Military Activity Since 2024
Zamira described several major trends:
– Since **2024**, the People’s Liberation Army has increased both the **frequency** and **scale** of drills around Taiwan.
– Exercises have expanded geographically, including around strategic areas near the island.
– Drills increasingly involve multiple branches:
– Air forces.
– Naval forces.
– Missile forces.
– China’s deployments are expensive and resource-intensive, which Zamira interpreted as evidence that they are **costly signals**, not merely cheap talk.
– She used the example of aircraft carriers near Taiwan, noting that such deployments consume large amounts of fuel and money.
#### Analytical Focus
Zamira defined China’s military escalation around Taiwan as involving:
– A sustained increase in the number of annual military exercises.
– Expansion into strategic areas around Taiwan.
– Greater coordination among different military branches.
– Military signaling in response to perceived external pressure.
#### Causes of China’s Behavior
Zamira identified two major explanations:
##### 1. Deterrence Against U.S. Intervention
– China perceives growing external pressure, especially from deepening **U.S.-Taiwan political and military relations**.
– She discussed the possibility of increased U.S. military presence in the region.
– She described a potential strategic line from **Korea / Japan / Taiwan** that could block or restrict China’s access to the Pacific.
– She argued that Chinese leaders fear that if Taiwan allows U.S. missile deployments, the United States could significantly increase its regional containment of China.
##### 2. National Reunification and Identity
– China also frames Taiwan as a core issue of national unity and sovereignty.
– Zamira emphasized that Chinese officials see Taiwan not simply as a U.S.-China issue, but as a historical reunification issue.
– She noted that Chinese rhetoric repeatedly stresses that Taiwan is part of China.
#### Evidence from Official Statements
Zamira cited official statements from Chinese institutions:
– China’s Ministry of National Defense has said the PLA will take all necessary measures to counter external interference and Taiwan independence activities.
– China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has opposed official U.S.-Taiwan exchanges and military contacts.
– Chinese officials have warned that such actions would be met with strong and resolute countermeasures.
– China’s State Council has framed military actions around Taiwan as necessary sovereignty measures and responses to provocations.
#### Comparative Assessment
Zamira compared the two explanations:
##### Deterrence Explanation
– Supported by direct official statements from China.
– Explains why China reacts to U.S.-Taiwan cooperation.
– Supported by observable military behavior.
##### Identity-Based Explanation
– Explains how China justifies its actions rhetorically.
– Explains the long-term importance of Taiwan to Chinese nationalism.
– However, Zamira argued that identity alone does not fully explain why escalation increased at specific moments after 2024.
#### Forecast
Zamira predicted continued gradual escalation but not major war in the immediate term.
##### Next 3–6 Months
– China will likely continue costly signaling.
– China may increase military presence around Taiwan.
– China may simulate blockade or invasion scenarios.
– China is unlikely to cross into direct invasion or full blockade.
##### Probability Estimates Discussed During Q&A
– Increased military exercises near Taiwan: approximately **30–40%** likelihood.
– Total blockade or total invasion: **less than 5%** likelihood.
#### Q&A and Discussion
##### Question from Jaimes Elena Mary
– Elena asked about China’s statement that U.S.-Taiwan official exchanges would be met with strong countermeasures.
– She asked whether such statements were mostly cheap talk, especially given that time had passed and U.S.-Taiwan arms discussions continued.
– Zamira responded that much of the rhetoric has been cheap talk.
– She noted that Chinese officials repeatedly said they would reunify Taiwan, but little changed for several years.
– She distinguished the post-2024 period, when some costly military signaling increased, from earlier rhetoric.
##### Question from Baktybekov Azamat Baktybekovich
– Azamat asked about the one-year outlook and the likelihood of escalation or de-escalation.
– Zamira answered that the situation depends heavily on the international arena.
– She argued that if the United States and other major powers are distracted by other conflicts, China might see an opportunity to act more aggressively toward Taiwan.
– She suggested that absent dramatic changes in the international system, China would likely only increase pressure gradually.
##### Instructor Follow-Up
– The instructor asked Zamira to define what escalation would actually mean.
– He asked for concrete examples of an escalatory scenario.
– Zamira gave the example of a Chinese aircraft carrier approaching Taiwan’s border or operating in a way that would no longer look like a normal exercise.
– The instructor then asked for probability estimates, prompting Zamira to clarify that:
– Increased exercises were plausible at 30–40%.
– A full blockade or invasion was below 5%.
##### Instructor Feedback
– The instructor noted that if the forecast required more research, it was acceptable to say so.
– He thanked Zamira for the presentation.
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### 4. Presentation 3 — Mamadboqirova Muqaddas Mamadboqirovna: Taiwan Strait Crisis Assessment and CCP Legitimacy
**Presenter:** Mamadboqirova Muqaddas Mamadboqirovna
**Case:** China-Taiwan crisis assessment
**Main Objective:** Forecast the Taiwan Strait conflict using costly signals, CCP identity, U.S. arms support, and potential escalation/de-escalation pathways.
#### Core Argument and Bottom Line
– Muqaddas argued that the Taiwan Strait conflict is likely to remain in the **status quo** over the forecast period.
– She assigned:
– **75%** likelihood to status quo.
– **15%** likelihood to escalation.
– **10%** likelihood to de-escalation.
– She emphasized that Taiwan reunification is central to **Chinese Communist Party legitimacy**.
– She framed the conflict as not merely foreign policy, but as a core issue for the CCP’s domestic legitimacy and national identity narrative.
#### Key Driver: PLA “Justice Mission 2025”
– Muqaddas identified the **PLA Justice Mission 2025** as a major recent driver.
– She described it as a large-scale encirclement drill around Taiwan lasting approximately three days.
– She said it was among the largest or most historically significant encirclement drills.
– She linked the drill to recent U.S.-Taiwan arms commitments.
#### Recent Timeline and Situation Update
Muqaddas reviewed developments from recent months:
– Taiwan’s prime minister continued claiming that Taiwan is an independent and fully sovereign country.
– China’s president reiterated in a New Year’s message that Taiwan reunification is inevitable or necessary.
– These rhetorical exchanges contributed to the PLA’s Justice Mission 2025.
– Taiwan also conducted response drills or defensive practices.
– Chinese officials continued insisting on “one nation” / “one China” narratives.
– Taiwanese officials continued asserting sovereignty and democratic independence.
– Around March 2025, the United States and Taiwan discussed or pledged another arms package, reportedly around **$14 billion**, though Muqaddas noted it had not yet been delivered on schedule.
#### Strategic Interaction Analysis
Muqaddas described a sequence of interaction:
1. CCP identity and legitimacy center Taiwan reunification.
2. Taiwan continues to distance itself from China politically.
3. U.S. military support increases Taiwan’s defensive capacity.
4. China interprets U.S. support as a threat.
5. Cross-strait tensions rise.
#### Bargaining Theory and Signals
Muqaddas differentiated costly signals from cheap talk.
##### Costly Signals
– PLA Justice Mission 2025.
– U.S. pledges and arms support to Taiwan.
– Large financial commitments, including previous U.S. support packages.
– Military readiness demonstrations from both China and Taiwan.
##### Cheap Talk / Lower-Cost Signals
– Chinese officials’ speeches emphasizing the 1992 Consensus.
– Public references to Taiwan reunification.
– General rhetorical claims from both sides.
She noted that rhetoric still matters because repeated messaging shapes the political environment, but action-based signals are more important for forecasting.
#### Forecasting Scenarios: 12–18 Months
##### Scenario 1: Status Quo — 75%
– Continued Chinese military pressure.
– Taiwan does not formally declare independence.
– U.S. support continues but does not trigger war.
– China maintains pressure without launching full invasion.
##### Scenario 2: Escalation — 15%
Possible triggers:
– Taiwan formally declares independence.
– A U.S.-China crisis develops.
– Miscalculation during military exercises.
– China decides the opportunity structure favors action.
Muqaddas argued escalation remains unlikely because:
– China still faces major economic constraints.
– Xi Jinping’s legitimacy would be damaged if an attempted takeover failed.
– China did not act even when other global conflicts could have provided distraction.
##### Scenario 3: De-escalation — 10%
Possible developments:
– Taiwan accepts some form of symbolic cross-strait dialogue.
– The United States reduces arms sales under Trump.
– A Beijing summit between Trump and Xi Jinping creates diplomatic adjustment.
– China and the United States reach a broader understanding that reduces pressure on Taiwan.
#### Indicators and Warnings
##### Escalation Indicators
– Increased military drills.
– Beijing withdraws remaining dialogue channels.
– Xi Jinping publicly ties Taiwan reunification to a more specific deadline.
– Taiwan moves toward formal independence.
##### De-escalation Indicators
– The $14 billion U.S. arms deal is delayed or cancelled.
– Taiwan accepts the 1992 Consensus or a symbolic version of the One China framework.
– Chinese air defense identification zone incursions drop below the 2024 baseline for a sustained period.
#### Q&A and Discussion
##### Question from Jaimes Elena Mary
– Elena asked how likely it is, based on internal Taiwanese politics, that Taiwan will move toward formal independence.
– Muqaddas replied that she does not think it is very likely.
– She referenced a Chinese friend who knows Taiwanese people and claimed that many Taiwanese still accept being Chinese or being connected to China.
– She noted that Taiwanese passports refer to the Republic of China, not simply “Taiwan.”
– She acknowledged that Taiwan sends many people annually for military preparation in case of conflict, making the question difficult.
##### Question from Turdueva Ainazik Muratalievna
– Ainazik asked about Muqaddas’s probability distribution and why she assigned 75% to status quo, 15% to escalation, and 10% to de-escalation.
– Muqaddas explained that China will likely continue pressure as a strategy, hoping Taiwan returns voluntarily.
– She argued that escalation is unlikely because China had opportunities to act amid other global distractions but did not.
– She emphasized the cost to Xi Jinping’s legitimacy if China attempts to take Taiwan and fails.
##### Question from Baktybekov Azamat Baktybekovich
– Azamat asked about the relationship between the Taiwan conflict and other existing global conflicts.
– Muqaddas answered that there is a connection because world attention is currently divided among Russia, Palestine, Iran, and U.S. foreign policy crises.
– She thought China might use global distraction to act but observed that China has instead moved toward diplomacy.
– She noted the upcoming Trump-Xi Beijing summit and predicted that Trump may take a more China-friendly approach.
– She argued that the $14 billion arms package may not actually be delivered, which could weaken Taiwan’s military readiness.
##### Instructor Question on Taiwan’s Role and Signals
– The instructor praised the presentation’s organization and clarity.
– He asked about the role of Taiwan in Muqaddas’s analysis.
– He noted that Taiwan’s formal independence was a major escalation scenario in her forecast, but most of her cost and signal analysis focused on China and the United States.
– He asked what signals from Taiwan would indicate that formal independence was approaching.
– Muqaddas responded that Taiwanese officials, including the prime minister, repeatedly describe Taiwan as a sovereign and independent country.
– She identified these statements as partly cheap talk but still relevant.
– She also noted that Taiwan conducts military practices simulating defense against Chinese maritime assault.
– She summarized the difficulty of analysis by saying one side is showing readiness to attack while the other is showing readiness to defend itself.
##### Instructor Feedback
– The instructor described the presentation as very good, visually strong, well organized, fast-paced, and clear.
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### 5. Presentation 4 — De Wever Sophie Louise: U.S.-Iran Conflict, Nuclear Security Dilemma, and Forecasting
**Presenter:** De Wever Sophie Louise
**Case:** U.S.-Iran conflict and regional escalation risk
**Main Objective:** Forecast the U.S.-Iran confrontation using security dilemma logic, cost analysis, and escalation/de-escalation scenarios.
#### Core Argument and Bottom Line
– Sophie argued that the most likely outcome is continued **status quo conflict**:
– Hostilities continue.
– Strikes or limited military actions may continue.
– Full-scale war remains unlikely.
– De-escalation is also unlikely.
– Her main forecast placed status quo at approximately **65%**.
– She estimated escalation at approximately **25%**.
– De-escalation was the least likely scenario, implied at approximately **10%**.
#### Security Dynamic
Sophie emphasized the importance of the security dilemma:
– The United States and Israel view Iran’s nuclear program as a major threat.
– Iran views U.S. power and regional pressure as major threats.
– Each side’s defensive behavior is interpreted by the other as offensive.
– This mutual insecurity drives continued tension and military interaction.
#### Current Conflict Dynamics
Sophie described the conflict as involving:
– Strikes and attacks.
– Retaliatory regional attacks by Iran.
– U.S. naval activity and blockades in the region.
– Pressure around the Strait of Hormuz, which she described as a strategic trade route, especially for oil.
– Recent diplomatic talks that were cancelled by the United States, suggesting little momentum toward de-escalation.
#### Costs for the United States
##### If the U.S. Escalates
– It risks a larger war.
– It would require major financial and military resources.
– U.S. forces would face greater military exposure.
– Domestic backlash could increase because war with Iran is unpopular in the United States.
– Escalation could harm Trump’s domestic popularity.
##### If the U.S. Does Not Act
– Iran may move closer to nuclear capability.
– The United States could appear weak.
– U.S. credibility as a global power could be damaged.
– Allies may question U.S. commitments.
#### Costs for Iran
##### If Iran Escalates
– It risks U.S. military destruction of Iranian assets.
– The economy could collapse under war pressure.
– Regime instability could increase.
– The United States may attempt or support regime change.
##### If Iran Does Not Act
– Iran risks humiliation.
– Its deterrence posture weakens.
– The regime may lose legitimacy domestically and regionally.
#### Forecasting Scenarios
##### Scenario 1: De-escalation — Lowest Probability
Sophie argued de-escalation is highly unlikely because:
– The parties deeply distrust each other.
– Neither side can be sure the other will honor a ceasefire or compromise.
– Domestic political costs make compromise difficult.
– Ideological hostility contributes to the conflict.
– Diplomatic momentum is weak or absent.
##### Scenario 2: Escalation — 25%
Escalation remains possible because:
– Active diplomacy is lacking.
– The security dilemma is intensifying.
– Repeated military interactions increase the risk of miscalculation.
– Leaders may escalate to avoid appearing weak.
##### Scenario 3: Status Quo — 65%
The most likely outcome is continued managed hostility:
– Nuclear-related conflicts historically often remain contained because the costs of nuclear escalation are catastrophic.
– Some limited or interim negotiation may occur but not enough for resolution.
– The United States wants to contain Iran without triggering a wider war.
– Both sides cannot afford a full war, but neither can afford to surrender.
#### Conclusion
– Sophie concluded that both sides are trapped:
– They cannot afford full-scale war.
– They cannot politically afford surrender.
– Therefore, the most likely foreseeable outcome is continued limited confrontation and controlled conflict.
#### Q&A and Discussion
##### Question from Baktybekov Azamat Baktybekovich
– Azamat asked whether the U.S.-Iran situation resembles Russia’s conflict with Ukraine.
– Sophie answered that there are similarities because both involve a major power and a weaker or smaller state.
– She compared the security dilemma in Ukraine, where Russia feared Ukraine joining NATO, to Iran’s concern about U.S. pressure and the U.S. concern over Iran’s nuclear program.
– She also noted major differences:
– Russia-Ukraine involves full-scale invasion.
– U.S.-Iran currently involves strikes and limited confrontation, not full invasion.
##### Question from Jaimes Elena Mary
– Elena asked why Sophie described the war as unpopular in the United States.
– Sophie said she had looked at public opinion statistics and media coverage in earlier research.
– She argued that Trump himself is not broadly popular and that U.S. involvement in Iran is not viewed as justified by many Americans.
– She also noted that media language often indicates skepticism about the justification for war.
##### Instructor Question on Costly Signals vs. Cheap Talk
– The instructor praised Sophie’s cost analysis.
– He asked which U.S. signals should be considered costly and which are reversible cheap talk.
– Sophie answered that the United States has sent many signals, including threats of full-scale invasion and rejection of compromise proposals.
– She argued that some signals are cheap talk, especially given Trump’s tendency toward strong rhetoric without action.
– However, she noted that threats of sending troops or launching invasion could become costly if repeated and not followed through, because credibility and legitimacy would be affected.
##### Instructor Feedback
– The instructor thanked Sophie and praised the comprehensiveness of the presentation.
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### 6. Transition Discussion: Remaining Presentations and Missing Students
– The instructor stated that the class was nearing the end and that there were still presentations left.
– There was confusion about who still needed to present.
– **Orolova Altynai Sharshenalyevna** was identified as needing to present.
– **Wyatt Adam James** was mentioned as absent or missing.
– Students commented that they had seen Adam around campus previously, but he was not present in class.
– One student suggested he might be busy with program-related obligations.
– The instructor expressed surprise because Adam had previously had good attendance or presence.
—
### 7. Presentation 5 — Orolova Altynai Sharshenalyevna: Greenland, Climate Change, and Arctic Great Power Competition
**Presenter:** Orolova Altynai Sharshenalyevna
**Case:** Greenland and Arctic strategic competition
**Main Objective:** Assess how climate change, U.S. political pressure, and Russian/Chinese activity affect Greenland’s strategic importance and future conflict risk.
#### Core Argument and Bottom Line
– Altynai argued that the most likely scenario is continued **status quo**, with the United States increasing presence but not gaining formal control.
– She assigned the status quo scenario approximately **65%** likelihood.
– She identified key drivers as:
– U.S. political pressure.
– Arctic competition.
– China and Russia’s growing interest.
– Climate change opening access to Arctic routes and resources.
#### Strategic Context
Altynai explained Greenland’s importance:
– Greenland is an autonomous territory of Denmark.
– The United States has an important military presence there, including a space or air base.
– She referenced the 1951 agreement connected to U.S. military presence.
– The Arctic’s importance is increasing due to climate change.
– Melting ice is opening:
– Shipping routes.
– Access to natural resources.
– Military and surveillance opportunities.
– China has expressed interest in the Arctic through its “Polar Silk Road” strategy.
– Russia is also active in Arctic competition.
#### Climate Change and Strategic Competition
Altynai emphasized that climate change is not just environmental but geopolitical:
– Melting ice increases Arctic access each year.
– New shipping routes may reduce travel times.
– New access to minerals and resources increases competition.
– Arctic states and great powers have stronger incentives to establish military and economic presence.
– Greenland becomes more strategically valuable as access improves.
#### Signals: Cheap Talk vs. Costly Signals
##### Cheap Talk
– U.S. statements about wanting to acquire or control Greenland.
– Trump-era remarks about purchasing Greenland.
– Political statements framed as domestic and foreign security needs.
##### Costly Signals
– U.S. military activity in Greenland.
– Operation or reopening of the Pituffik / Thule space base infrastructure.
– Reopening or strengthening U.S. consular presence.
– Infrastructure and mining investments.
#### Forecasting Scenarios
##### Scenario 1: Status Quo — 65%
– The United States increases presence without taking control.
– Cooperation continues through NATO.
– Denmark and Greenland retain sovereignty.
– U.S. engagement remains diplomatic, military, and economic, but not annexationist.
##### Scenario 2: Escalation — 25%
– The United States increases political and economic pressure.
– Escalation could involve:
– Demands for control over bases.
– Intelligence expansion.
– Political interference.
– Tariffs or sanctions.
– In a worst case, direct annexation pressure or conflict.
##### Scenario 3: De-escalation — Approximately 10%
– Return to more normal competition.
– Diplomacy strengthens.
– The United States reduces aggressive rhetoric.
– Joint economic cooperation with Denmark becomes more stable.
– Pressure over sovereignty decreases.
#### Indicators and Warnings
##### Escalation Indicators
– U.S. demands to control military bases.
– Expanded intelligence activity.
– Increased political interference.
– More explicit statements about control or ownership.
– Intensified competition over Arctic resources.
##### De-escalation Indicators
– New U.S.-Denmark agreement.
– Reduced U.S. rhetoric.
– Diplomatic cooperation.
– Joint economic activities that respect Danish and Greenlandic sovereignty.
#### Q&A and Discussion
##### Question from Mamadboqirova Muqaddas Mamadboqirovna
– Muqaddas asked about the security implications of U.S. bases in Greenland.
– Altynai responded that U.S. bases create a security network in the Arctic and may intensify competition among major powers.
##### Question on Escalation
– A student asked Altynai to clarify what escalation would look like.
– Altynai answered that escalation could include tariffs, sanctions, economic pressure, or more direct political pressure.
– She added that in the worst case it could involve direct annexation threats or war.
##### Question from Mamadboqirova Muqaddas Mamadboqirovna on International Cooperation
– Muqaddas asked whether the anti-Danish or aggressive U.S. posture was specific to Trump or existed more broadly.
– Altynai responded that the threats and escalation were mainly associated with Trump’s position.
– She contrasted this with Biden, who she said did not focus on Greenland in the same way because of other priorities.
##### Question from Jaimes Elena Mary
– Elena asked about climate change and whether opening shipping lanes could be a net positive for Greenland or the United States.
– She asked whether melting ice increases U.S. interest in Greenland.
– Altynai responded that melting ice exposes new routes and resources, which makes Greenland more attractive in great power competition.
##### Instructor Question on Scenario Boundaries
– The instructor asked Altynai to clarify the difference between:
– U.S. increasing presence without control, and
– U.S. increasing political and economic pressure.
– He asked how the U.S. could expand presence without also increasing pressure.
– Altynai explained that in the status quo scenario, U.S. actions would remain relatively diplomatic:
– Investment.
– Economic cooperation.
– Relationship-building.
– Resource access through accepted channels.
– In the escalation scenario, U.S. behavior would become more openly coercive or direct.
##### Instructor Feedback
– The instructor noted that Altynai paced the presentation well and finished with time remaining.
—
### 8. Presentation 6 — Jaimes Elena Mary: China-Taiwan Security Dilemma, Blockade Risk, and Forecasting
**Presenter:** Jaimes Elena Mary
**Case:** China-Taiwan conflict
**Main Objective:** Forecast the Taiwan Strait crisis using a security dilemma framework, military drill data, costly signals, and escalation indicators.
#### Core Argument and Bottom Line
– Elena argued that the China-Taiwan conflict is a **classic security dilemma**.
– She stated that the current situation is essentially a standstill or status quo.
– She predicted that the status quo would continue over the next **18 months**.
– Her forecast:
– **75%** likelihood: status quo continues.
– **20%** likelihood: naval blockade or escalation.
– **5%** likelihood: de-escalation.
#### Ground Truth and Military Drill Data
Elena presented a graph comparing Chinese drills over time.
Key points:
– Drills fluctuate seasonally, often increasing in September.
– The data showed a notable pattern in **2025**, where drill activity increased toward the end of the year instead of declining.
– This upward trend continued into **2026**.
– She noted that some apparent decreases in PLA drill counts were misleading because China was using other forms of pressure, including civilian fishing boats.
#### Civilian Fishing Boats and Gray-Zone Pressure
Elena highlighted China’s use of civilian fishing vessels:
– Chinese fishing boats can be used to blockade or crowd Taiwanese ports.
– This creates a gray-zone problem:
– The actors are civilians, not uniformed soldiers.
– It is unclear whether such actions count as war, escalation, or coercive pressure.
– This makes response difficult for Taiwan and the United States.
#### Diplomatic Context
Elena mentioned recent and upcoming summits:
– A summit in South Korea focused mainly on trade and did not mention Taiwan significantly.
– She argued this omission was strategic because both sides were focused on economic issues.
– She noted an upcoming **Trump-Xi summit in Beijing on May 14–15**, where Taiwan was expected to be discussed.
– She identified this summit as an important event to monitor.
#### Amphibious Assault Simulations
– Elena stated that amphibious assault simulations are becoming increasingly realistic.
– She referenced the U.S. Naval War College as a source.
– She treated these simulations as potentially meaningful warning indicators because they could improve China’s readiness for invasion or blockade.
#### Theoretical Analysis
Elena used both realist and constructivist explanations.
##### Realist Perspective
– Taiwan, the United States, and China are caught in a security dilemma.
– Actions seen as defensive by one side are perceived as offensive by the other.
– The United States is moving into China’s regional sphere or “backyard.”
– Taiwan is geographically vulnerable:
– It is close to China.
– Chinese missiles can reach Taiwan.
– It is an island and therefore vulnerable to blockade.
– The balance of power is shifting through U.S. arms sales and regional positioning.
##### Constructivist Perspective
– Taiwanese identity is changing, especially among younger people.
– Although Taiwan’s official state structure uses the “Republic of China” framework, many young people identify more strongly as Taiwanese.
– China’s CCP promotes a “great rejuvenation” narrative under Xi Jinping.
– Reunification with Taiwan is tied to overcoming the “century of humiliation.”
– The United States frames its role partly around:
– Democracy vs. autocracy.
– Open markets.
– Opposition to communism.
##### Which Theory Holds More Weight?
– Elena argued that both realism and constructivism are highly relevant.
– However, she concluded that realism currently explains slightly more because of the concrete security dynamics produced by U.S. involvement near China.
#### Forecasting Scenarios
##### Scenario 1: Status Quo — 75%
– Military drills continue.
– The United States keeps supplying Taiwan with arms.
– China keeps pressuring Taiwan.
– No invasion or full blockade occurs.
##### Scenario 2: Escalation / Naval Blockade — 20%
– China pursues blockade or invasion-like measures.
– Elena noted that naval blockades are historically rare, so her baseline for blockade risk was low, around **10%**.
– Costly signals raised her estimate to 20%.
##### Scenario 3: De-escalation — 5%
– De-escalation is very unlikely.
– It would require:
– Peaceful unification, with Taiwan accepting CCP rule, or
– China recognizing Taiwanese independence.
– Elena argued that both are highly improbable.
#### Costly Signals Preventing De-escalation
Elena identified several costly signals that make backing down difficult:
– U.S. arms package to Taiwan.
– CCP Justice Mission 2025 / large-scale military drill.
– Proposal to increase Taiwan’s defense budget by approximately **$40 billion**.
– Repeated Chinese military drills.
– Increasing U.S.-Taiwan military collaboration.
#### Prohibitive Costs Making Escalation Less Likely
Elena also explained why escalation is still unlikely:
– Conflict would create an “economic apocalypse” due to trade disruption.
– China, Taiwan, and the United States would all suffer.
– Taiwan’s semiconductor industry is highly vulnerable.
– China relies heavily on Taiwan’s semiconductor industry.
– Even if China seized factories, production would collapse without international inputs such as silicon and other resources.
– Other states would likely sanction or isolate China.
#### Indicators and Warnings
Elena identified warning signs that would increase escalation risk:
– Chinese military drills increase consistently by **20–30% or more**.
– U.S.-Taiwan military cooperation deepens significantly.
– The United States signs a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan.
– China begins stockpiling energy and food, indicating preparation for sanctions or war.
– Repetition or expansion of Justice Mission-style drills.
#### Q&A and Discussion
##### Question from De Wever Sophie Louise
– Sophie asked about Chinese civilians involved in fishing boat operations.
– She asked whether Chinese citizens are aware of Taiwan policy and whether they support China taking back Taiwan.
– Elena responded that many Chinese citizens are aware of the government’s Taiwan position and generally support reunification.
– She said there is some younger population that may be less supportive, but generally many Chinese civilians view Taiwanese people as connected to China and support reunification.
##### Question from Mamadboqirova Muqaddas Mamadboqirovna
– Muqaddas asked whether China would risk economic stability for Taiwan.
– She asked whether Elena thought China would eventually reunify Taiwan or recognize its independence.
– Elena responded that China is unlikely to recognize Taiwanese independence.
– She said that by the end of the decade, especially around **2030**, reunification attempts become more likely based on Xi Jinping’s statements and U.S. intelligence assessments.
– She argued Xi may look weak or illegitimate if he takes no action.
– She suggested possible futures:
– Taiwan joins China willingly due to pro-China political shifts.
– China launches a blockade or invasion.
– War goes badly for China and Taiwan becomes independent as a result.
##### Follow-Up from Mamadboqirova Muqaddas Mamadboqirovna
– Muqaddas asked why Elena emphasized realism over constructivism, given that Chinese education and national history strongly emphasize Taiwan’s cultural and historical significance.
– Elena answered that young people should not be underestimated.
– She argued that even if Chinese schools teach strong nationalist narratives, young people have access to outside information and social media.
– She acknowledged public support for reunification but said it is not overwhelming enough to explain everything.
– She returned to realism because U.S. arms sales and military involvement create a classic security dilemma.
##### Instructor Note
– The instructor said there was no time left for his own question.
– The class applauded Elena and all presenters.
—
### 9. End-of-Class Wrap-Up and Group Photo
– The instructor thanked the class for the semester.
– He said it was his tradition to take a group picture at the end of each semester.
– Students moved to the front of the room near the presentation screen.
– There were some technical difficulties with the camera memory card, so the instructor used his phone and watch to take the photo.
– The instructor asked students to bunch together so everyone would fit in the frame.
– Two photos were taken.
– The instructor thanked students again.
– He wished exchange students a good experience at AUCA and encouraged them to return to Kyrgyzstan.
– He told continuing students he would see them next year.
– He wished graduating students good luck.
—
## Student Tracker
– **Turdueva Ainazik Muratalievna** — Presented on Greenland, U.S. Arctic pressure, sovereignty, NATO, and forecasted a 75% status quo outcome; answered questions on NATO exercises, Iran’s possible effect on U.S. focus, and forecasting baselines.
– **Sangmamadova Zamira Marodbekovna** — Presented on China’s increasing military presence around Taiwan, distinguishing cheap talk from costly military signaling; forecasted continued pressure but low probability of invasion or blockade.
– **Mamadboqirova Muqaddas Mamadboqirovna** — Presented a Taiwan Strait crisis assessment centered on CCP legitimacy, U.S. arms packages, and PLA Justice Mission 2025; contributed several questions on Greenland, Taiwan, international conflict linkages, and theory selection.
– **De Wever Sophie Louise** — Presented on the U.S.-Iran conflict, emphasizing security dilemma dynamics, costs of escalation/non-action, and a 65% status quo forecast; asked questions about Iran’s effect on Greenland and Chinese civilian support for Taiwan policy.
– **Orolova Altynai Sharshenalyevna** — Presented on Greenland, climate change, Arctic resources, U.S. pressure, and Russia/China competition; forecasted a 65% status quo scenario and clarified escalation versus diplomatic presence.
– **Jaimes Elena Mary** — Presented on the China-Taiwan security dilemma, military drills, blockade risk, gray-zone fishing boat tactics, and an 18-month forecast; also asked multiple detailed questions during other students’ presentations.
– **Baktybekov Azamat Baktybekovich** — Asked several comparative and forecasting questions, including about Greenland’s internal/external crisis dynamics, Taiwan escalation probabilities, global conflict correlations, and comparisons between U.S.-Iran and Russia-Ukraine security dilemmas.
—
## Actionable Items
### Urgent / Immediate
– **Follow up with Wyatt Adam James** regarding missed class/presentation status, since he was explicitly noted as absent and still apparently expected to present.
– **Confirm final presentation completion records**, especially for any students who were expected to present but did not appear in the transcript.
– **Ensure all presentation files were received** by email or course platform, especially those sent during class.
### Assessment / Grading Follow-Up
– **Review each presenter’s probability baselines**, especially where the instructor asked for clearer explanation of baseline rates.
– **Check whether students clearly distinguished cheap talk from costly signals**, as this was a recurring evaluation theme.
– **Assess whether forecasts included concrete indicators and warnings**, since some presentations were stronger than others on measurable warning signs.
– **Evaluate use of theory**, especially realism vs. constructivism, where several students made explicit theoretical claims.
### Pedagogical Notes for Future Lessons
– Students generally understood status quo / escalation / de-escalation forecasting structures, but some needed more precision in:
– Defining the exact outcome being forecast.
– Explaining baseline probabilities.
– Connecting probability estimates to evidence.
– Differentiating rhetorical statements from irreversible or costly commitments.
– Taiwan presentations overlapped substantially; future versions could assign students different sub-questions to reduce repetition, such as:
– Taiwan domestic politics.
– PLA military readiness.
– U.S. strategic ambiguity.
– Economic costs of blockade.
– Identity and public opinion.
– Several students benefited from being pressed to provide concrete escalation examples; this should remain a regular Q&A focus.
### Administrative / End-of-Semester
– Group photo completed at end of class.
– Instructor gave closing remarks to exchange students, continuing students, and graduating students.
– No explicit homework assignment was given in the transcript.
Homework Instructions:
NO HOMEWORK. The lesson consisted of student presentations, Q&A, and a final group photo request (“There’s one last thing that I have to ask you to do… I like to take a group picture”), and the class ended with farewell remarks (“Thank you once again… I’ll see you next year”) without any homework or follow-up assignment being given.