Lesson Report:
## Title: From “What Happened?� to “Why?� — Building a Realist Hypothesis for Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine
**Synopsis (2–3 sentences):**
This session focused on moving from fact-gathering (“what happened�) to explanation (“why did it happen�) by using **hypothesis-building** grounded in an **international relations (IR) theoretical framework**. Students refined a **realist** explanation for Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine by turning realist concepts into a practical diagnostic checklist and then synthesizing those elements into a single testable hypothesis. The class concluded by previewing **constructivism** as a competing framework to be used next week and assigning a reading designed to help students build a constructivist checklist/hypothesis.
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## Attendance
– **Absent:** 1 student
– Hermine (not present)
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## Topics Covered (Chronological, Detailed)
### 1) Opening: Re-forming Tuesday Partner Groups + Attendance
– Instructor asked students to **find the same partners from Tuesday** and then took attendance.
– Date noted: **February 19**.
– Students present were verbally confirmed (e.g., Albina, Azamat, Zoe, Sophie, Nino, Elena, Mukadas, Altanai, Zamira, Aynazik, Adam, etc.).
– **Hermine was the only student explicitly marked absent.**
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### 2) Course Skill Transition: From Description (“What�) to Explanation (“Why�)
– Instructor restated the week’s main objective: shifting from **collecting facts** about events to explaining **why events happen**.
– Key methodological point:
– Saying “X happened because Yâ€� is **not enough**; the class is training in a **scientific approach** for political science.
– Hypothesis structure reviewed:
– A good hypothesis includes:
– **Dependent variable (DV):** the outcome/event to explain
– **Independent variables (IVs):** plausible causes
– Complication addressed: without a guide, “possible causesâ€� are endless.
– Solution introduced/reinforced: **IR theories provide a “theoretical frameworkâ€�**
– Defined as a **structured starting point / checklist** for where to look for causes
– Purpose: helps build hypotheses that can later be **tested** (true/false/partially supported)
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### 3) Review + Clarification: The Security Dilemma (Realist Concept)
**Goal:** Ensure everyone understands the concept before applying it to Ukraine.
– Instructor asked: *What is a security dilemma?*
– Working definition emphasized:
– When one state takes actions it believes are **defensive** (e.g., military buildup), the rival cannot verify intent.
– Due to **indistinguishability** (can’t reliably separate defense from offense), the rival assumes the **worst-case** and interprets moves as potentially offensive.
– Bridge to the case study:
– The class returned to the **2008 NATO Bucharest Summit** and its relevance for realist explanations of Russia’s invasion.
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### 4) Applying Security Dilemma to Ukraine: 2008 Bucharest Summit + Indistinguishability
**Instructor-guided recap with student contributions.**
– Why the **2008 Bucharest Summit** mattered:
– NATO indicated **Ukraine and Georgia would eventually be able to join** NATO.
– Crucially missing details (highlighted by instructor):
– **No clear timeline** for when Ukraine would join
– **No interim security guarantees/protection** until membership
– Instructor framing: “worst of both worldsâ€�
– Ukraine becomes publicly associated with future NATO membership without receiving immediate NATO protection.
– Additional evidence tied to indistinguishability:
– Post-2008, some NATO members began sending **weapons and missile defense systems** (generalized as “weaponsâ€� and “armamentsâ€�) to Ukraine.
– Western justification: **defensive support** to deter/prepare for possible Russian aggression.
– Realist logic: Russia has **no rational way** to verify defensive intent; therefore Russia assumes offensive potential (worst-case planning).
– Russian worst-case interpretation discussed:
– Not necessarily fear of Ukraine autonomously attacking Russia, but fear that:
– the **United States** is “pulling stringsâ€� and using Ukraine as an **offensive hedge/leverage** against Russia.
– Emphasis on Russia’s fear of losing a buffer zone:
– If Ukraine enters NATO, a major **buffer between Russia and NATO disappears**.
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### 5) Activity 1 (Pairs): Write a 2–3 Sentence Answer — “Is There a Security Dilemma?�
**Purpose:** Convert realist reasoning into a clean, testable statement usable as an independent variable.
– Students were instructed to produce a short response answering:
– “Do defensive moves by one state look like offensive moves by another?â€�
– Along with implied sub-questions:
– What were the defensive moves?
– Who made them?
– Who interpreted them as offensive?
– Why?
– Class share-out and instructor refinement:
– The “defensive movesâ€� identified and shaped into a clearer answer:
– Ukraine seeking NATO membership (via the **Membership Action Plan / MAP** discussion)
– Ukraine receiving **arms from NATO states**
– “Otherâ€� actor specified: **Russia**
– Instructor emphasized **perception**:
– Russia sees arms buildup as effectively **US/NATO arms near its border**
– NATO membership prospect is framed as a direct strategic threat (NATO near/at Russia’s border)
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### 6) Realist Checklist Element 2: Balance of Power Shift (Entering Another’s “Backyard�)
**Concept review + operational question + paired discussion + evidence integration.**
– Instructor defined balance of power:
– Global politics tends toward multiple competing powers rather than one global controller.
– A relatively stable “balanceâ€� can feel “comfortable,â€� and threats arise when a rival encroaches on a sphere of influence.
– Operational diagnostic question posed:
– “Is one party entering the backyard (sphere of influence) of another?â€�
– Students instructed to clarify:
– Who are the parties?
– Did one actor perceive encroachment into its sphere?
– Student answer synthesized with instructor prompts:
– Russia perceives **NATO expansion toward Ukraine** as entry into Russia’s “backyard.â€�
– US/NATO involvement evidenced through:
– Weapons support
– Financial aid (mentioned by students)
– Instructor added a key third piece of evidence from Tuesday:
– **Euromaidan** (2013–2014 protests) as perceived by Russia:
– Russia views Euromaidan as installing a **US-friendly** government in Ukraine.
– This is interpreted as American influence **replacing** Russian influence in a historically contested/important area.
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### 7) Realist Checklist Element 3: Window of Opportunity (New Evidence Required)
**Longer pair task (10 minutes) focused on generating additional evidence and logic.**
– Instructor explained the “window of opportunityâ€� concept:
– Opportunities to act are **temporary**; states may act when conditions are favorable but expected to worsen.
– Students were guided by sub-questions:
1) What does Russia **want** from invading, or what does it want to **avoid**?
2) What **conditions** made 2022 look like a good time to invade (as opposed to earlier)?
3) Why are those conditions perceived as **temporary** (time limit / “now or never�)?
– Share-out highlights:
– What Russia wants to avoid:
– **Ukraine becoming a NATO state** / NATO infrastructure on Russia’s border
– What Russia might want to gain (realist framing):
– **Territorial/security gains** (expanding/strengthening strategic depth), with mention of Donetsk/Luhansk as strategically valuable areas
– Evidence used:
– Reference to a Russian security/ultimatum-type document (students referenced a “draftâ€�/security declaration; transcript implies a Russian security demand context—used as supporting evidence that NATO in Ukraine was a core issue)
– Conditions + temporality (why 2022):
– Russia observed Ukraine’s growing **military capacity**, arms, and Western support.
– The NATO membership path (MAP / “eventual membershipâ€�) made Russia feel time was running out.
– Once Ukraine joined NATO, invasion would become **too costly or impossible**; therefore Russia perceived the need to act before the window closed.
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### 8) Realist Checklist Element 4 (Brief): Geographic Vulnerability / Feasibility
**Instructor covered quickly due to time.**
– Geographic feasibility framed as:
– Beyond political opportunity, invasion requires practical geographic access/vulnerability.
– Instructor concluded Russia likely perceived geographic vulnerability as present:
– Multiple access routes and long borders
– Examples tied to the actual invasion pattern:
– Entry via **Belarus**
– Entry through **eastern Ukraine**
– Terrain characterization: large land borders, plains, limited natural barriers (relative ease of entry from Russia’s perspective)
– Brief discussion on Belarus:
– A student raised Belarus’s stated intentions vs. what occurred.
– Instructor noted Belarus is important but **not enough time** to deeply analyze Belarusian interests; realist framing suggests Belarus may have limited choice.
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### 9) Student Question: “Legitimacy� and Symbolic/Ideological Timing vs. Realist Explanation
– Student asked whether, beyond political opportunity, **symbolic/legitimacy** conditions mattered (e.g., historical narratives, recognition of Donetsk/Luhansk as enabling troop presence).
– Instructor response (realist lens):
– **Legitimacy** and ideology are secondary/background for realism.
– Realism prioritizes **hard interests and survival**; legitimacy matters only if it supports interests.
– Instructor flagged this as an opening to competing theories—foreshadowing constructivism.
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### 10) Synthesis: Constructing the Full Realist Hypothesis (DV + IVs)
**Instructor modeled how to assemble the checklist items into a single hypothesis.**
– **Dependent Variable (DV):**
– “In 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine.â€�
– **Independent Variables (IVs) assembled from the checklist:**
1) **Security dilemma**:
– NATO’s 2008 signal of future membership without timeline/guarantees + weapon flows increase threat perception; Russia interprets “defenseâ€� as potential offense.
2) **Balance of power shift / sphere-of-influence encroachment**:
– Russia perceives NATO/US entering its backyard via NATO integration, arming Ukraine, and political influence (including Euromaidan perception).
3) **Window of opportunity**:
– Russia believes time is running out as Ukraine’s capabilities and NATO integration progress; delay increases costs and reduces feasibility.
4) **Geographic feasibility**:
– Russia believes geography and multiple routes provide a practical opportunity for a fast operation (“three day special operationâ€� expectation).
– Instructor reiterated the meta-point:
– This is not presented as “the truth,â€� but as a **testable realist hypothesis** to be compared against competing theories.
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### 11) Transition to Next Unit: Why Realism May Be Incomplete + Introduction to Constructivism
– Instructor noted a potential limitation of realism:
– Putin’s repeated historical/identity narratives about Ukraine raise questions that realism may not fully capture.
– Next week’s focus:
– Competing explanation: **constructivism**
– Goal: build a **constructivist hypothesis** more quickly, analogous to how realism was turned into a checklist.
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### 12) Assignment / Closing Plan
– Reading assignment:
– A text by **Jervis** (presented as a key constructivist/pioneer in this unit).
– Instructions for the reading:
– Do not merely summarize; read with the explicit goal of building a **constructivist checklist**:
– “What does a constructivist (like Jervis) think causes international conflict?â€�
– Forward course plan:
– Next Thursday: return to students’ **situation report issues** and have students **apply hypothesis-building to their case studies**.
– Class ended with brief closing remarks.
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## Actionable Items (Short Bullets, Organized by Urgency)
### High Urgency (Before Next Class)
– **Assign/confirm access to the Jervis reading** (ensure all students can obtain it).
– Students must **create a constructivist “checklistâ€�** from Jervis (not a general summary).
– Prepare to **build a constructivist hypothesis in class** next week (instructor plan).
### Medium Urgency (Next Week / Next Thursday)
– Re-integrate class with **students’ situation reports** (as stated).
– Design next Thursday’s activity: students **apply hypothesis-building to their case studies** (likely in groups).
– Consider providing a **template** for:
– DV/IV formatting
– Evidence-to-claim chain (“Because X evidence, actor perceived Y, leading to Z behaviorâ€�)
### Low Urgency (Course Tracking / Follow-up)
– Track attendance pattern: **Hermine absent** (note for follow-up if absences accumulate).
– Optional: revisit the “legitimacy/identityâ€� question explicitly as a bridge into constructivism (student interest was clearly expressed).
Homework Instructions:
ASSIGNMENT #1: Jervis reading + constructivist “checklist� for why conflicts happen
You will prepare for next week’s shift from the realist hypothesis-building we did in class (security dilemma, balance of power shift, window of opportunity, geographic vulnerability) by reading a constructivist text and translating its core argument into a practical diagnostic checklist you can use to build a constructivist hypothesis.
Instructions:
1. Get the assigned reading:
1. Locate and open the text by Jervis that was assigned at the end of class (“I’m going to be assigning you a text by an author named Jervis…�).
2. Read with a specific purpose (do not read passively):
1. As you read, keep the guiding question in front of you: **What does a constructivist (like Jervis) think explains why international conflict happens?**
2. Focus on extracting the author’s *causal logic* (the “why�), not just definitions or historical examples.
3. Identify Jervis’s key explanatory factors:
1. While reading, mark or note places where Jervis indicates a cause, mechanism, or reason conflicts occur (e.g., things that shape how states interpret threats, make decisions, or construct meanings).
2. For each factor you think is central, write a brief note in your own words explaining what it is and how it contributes to conflict.
4. Convert the reading into a **constructivist diagnostic checklist**:
1. Create a checklist (a short list of criteria/questions) that someone could apply to a real case—similar to how we turned realism into a checklist in class.
2. Write your checklist as clear “yes/no or diagnostic� questions where possible (for example: “Is X present?� “Does Y shape perceptions?� “Are actors interpreting Z in a particular shared way?�).
3. Ensure the checklist reflects Jervis’s constructivist perspective (i.e., it should not simply repeat the realist checklist we used in class).
5. Keep the checklist concise and usable:
1. Aim for a short, practical set of checklist items (enough to capture the theory’s main logic without becoming a summary of every page).
2. Make sure each item is something you could later use to build a hypothesis about a conflict (as we did for Russia–Ukraine using realism).
6. Bring/prepare your checklist for next class:
1. Your checklist will be used next week when we “start trying to apply… [and] build a constructivist hypothesis� more quickly than we did with realism.