Lesson Report:
# Title
**Signaling Round Two: Fearon, Cheap Talk, and Costly Signals in Case-Study Forecasting**
This session continued the class’s work on signaling in international relations, with a specific goal of making sure students could explain why costly signals matter and apply them to their own semester case studies. The lesson began with a review of Fearon’s argument about why wars occur despite the high costs of war, then moved into a focused discussion of audience costs and alliance commitments before students returned to their own argumentative chains to test and refine case-specific signals.
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# Attendance
– **Formal attendance was not taken in the transcript.**
– **Students mentioned absent / not present:** **1**
– **Muqaddas Mamadboqirovna** *(likely; transcript says “Mukhadasan,” so this identification is somewhat uncertain)* — the instructor noted, “we lost Mukhadasan,” during the transition into group work / board activity.
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# Topics Covered
## 1. Opening framing: “Signaling round two” and lesson objectives
– The instructor opened by stating that the class would continue its second round of work on **signaling**.
– The day’s objective was made explicit:
– ensure that **everyone understands the concept of signaling**;
– explain **how costly signals are used by leaders generally**;
– connect that logic directly to the **specific country cases** students have been working on during the semester.
– The class was told that the session would return to **Fearon** and then move toward applying signaling logic to students’ **forecasting / argumentative chain work**.
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## 2. Review of Fearon: why do states go to war if war is so costly?
– The instructor brought the class back to the reading from **Fearon**, which students had been assigned for homework.
– The review began from Fearon’s basic claim:
– **war is expensive**;
– it costs **money**,
– **human life**,
– and potentially **political capital**.
– From there, the instructor contrasted two broad state options when conflict arises:
– **fight / go to war**, or
– **negotiate / discuss / make a deal**.
### Key conceptual question posed to the class
– If war is so costly and negotiation is usually cheaper, **why do states still go to war?**
### Student contributions
– A student responded that the alternative to fighting is to engage in **“negotiations and discussions”**, helping establish the basic contrast between war and bargaining.
– The instructor then guided students toward Fearon’s explanation:
– wars happen not because leaders prefer war in the abstract,
– but because **negotiations break down**.
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## 3. Incentives to lie: information problems in bargaining
– The instructor emphasized Fearon’s core argument that bargaining often fails because **each side has an incentive to lie**.
### Vocabulary clarification: “incentive”
– The instructor paused to define **incentive**, asking students what the word means.
– A student explained it as **motivation**, and the instructor expanded:
– an incentive exists when there is **some benefit to doing something**.
– Example used:
– students have an incentive to get good grades because of future benefits such as **job prospects** or **master’s program admissions**.
### What do states lie about?
– The instructor then pushed students to specify **what** states lie about in negotiations.
### Student contributions
– A student answered that states lie about their **incentives**.
– The instructor narrowed the question further.
– **Jaimes Elena Mary** clearly contributed the key answer:
– states often lie about their **military capabilities** and their **willingness to enter war**.
– Another student added that this includes a state’s **strength** and **interest / willingness**.
### Why lie?
– The class discussed why states misrepresent these things:
– if the opponent believes you are stronger than you really are,
– or more willing to fight than you really are,
– they may be **deterred** from escalating.
– The instructor emphasized a further Fearon point:
– it is not only that states lie,
– but that **everyone knows everyone has an incentive to lie**.
– Therefore, ordinary verbal statements become **cheap talk**.
### Main theoretical outcome from this section
– According to the instructor’s summary of Fearon:
– wars occur because **states cannot accurately judge each other’s strength and resolve**;
– they **underestimate or overestimate** one another;
– bargaining breaks down, and both sides may end up in a war that leaves them **worse off than a negotiated settlement would have**.
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## 4. Transition to costly signals: solving the cheap-talk problem
– After establishing that “talk is cheap,” the instructor introduced the next major question:
– if everyone knows states may lie,
– **how can a state communicate that it is serious?**
– The answer introduced was:
– **costly signals**.
### Defining costly signals
– The instructor asked students to restate what a costly signal is.
### Student contributions
– One student said costly signals are **actions** that show “we will do something.”
– The instructor pressed further:
– how do we know the action is not just more bluffing?
– **Jaimes Elena Mary** gave the strongest response here, identifying that costly signals involve **real costs** and naming several Fearon-style mechanisms, including:
– **building weapons**,
– **mobilizing troops**,
– **signing alliance treaties**,
– **supporting troops in foreign territory**,
– and **creating domestic political costs**.
### Focus of the day
– The instructor then narrowed the day’s emphasis:
– the class would focus especially on **audience costs**.
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## 5. Audience costs: hand-tying and punishment by domestic audiences
– The instructor explained audience costs as cases where a leader **commits publicly or semi-publicly** to a course of action, such that backing down would impose a **real political penalty**.
– The idea was described in “hand-tying” terms:
– leaders structure the situation so that if they fail to follow through, they lose something valuable.
### China–Taiwan example revisited
– The instructor referred back to a previous example from class involving **China and Taiwan**:
– if Chinese leaders say they will respond if another power intervenes in Taiwan,
– and then fail to act when intervention occurs,
– this could make them look **weak** to domestic audiences.
– The political consequence described:
– a leader may lose **legitimacy** or **popularity** needed for political survival.
### Clarifying the “audience”
– The instructor emphasized that the audience in audience costs is typically **domestic**.
– Students and instructor then unpacked what “losing legitimacy” actually means:
– in democracies, it can mean **losing votes**;
– in non-democracies, it can mean losing support from **powerful insiders**, party elites, or other crucial constituencies.
### Student contribution
– During this part of the discussion, **Jaimes Elena Mary** was explicitly referenced again for earlier mentioning the China/Taiwan case.
– A student later asked / pushed the class to specify **who exactly punishes** a leader in the China case.
– The instructor clarified that in China’s system, the decisive audience is not simply “the people” in a direct electoral sense, but more specifically the **Chinese Communist Party apparatus** and those who control leader selection and continued support.
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## 6. Alliance commitments as costly signals: NATO and the Warsaw Pact
– The class then moved from domestic audience costs to alliance-based commitments.
### NATO as an example
– The instructor asked students to recall the treaty organization discussed previously.
– Students identified **NATO**.
– The instructor laid out the logic:
– joining NATO provides the benefit that if a member is attacked, **other members are expected to help**;
– but joining also imposes **responsibilities**;
– if another member is attacked, a state may be expected or obliged to assist.
### Why alliances can be costly signals
– The instructor explained two kinds of costs tied to alliance commitments:
1. **If the alliance fails to defend a member**, the alliance itself loses value and credibility.
2. **If an individual member fails to help when required**, that member may face punishment or loss of standing within the alliance.
### Student contribution
– An **uncertain student** *(possibly Muqaddas Mamadboqirovna; not fully clear in the transcript)* connected this to the **Warsaw Pact**, describing an example in which a member that diverged from bloc expectations lost **economic and military support**.
– This contribution served to reinforce the point that treaty commitments can generate **real political and strategic consequences**, not merely rhetorical ones.
### Additional alliance discussion
– A student raised a hypothetical question about **Israel and NATO**, which led the instructor to discuss:
– the difficulty of admitting states whose security situations could create **ambiguous or high-risk obligations** for the alliance;
– why some states remain on indefinite waiting paths when alliance membership could drag the organization into conflict.
### Main takeaway from this section
– Alliance membership can function as a costly signal because it **raises the price of inaction**:
– members tie themselves to commitments,
– and failure to act can damage either the **alliance’s credibility** or the **member’s standing** within it.
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## 7. First application activity: identify hand-tying / audience-cost signals in each case study
– The instructor then shifted students from theory to application.
– Students were asked to turn to their **individual case studies** and identify:
– an example of **hand-tying** / audience costs,
– where a leader put their **domestic or international reputation** or even **political survival** at risk,
– by making or sending a signal they would be expected to follow through on.
### Specific prompts students were given
Students were told to ask:
– What is the signal?
– If the leader **did not follow through**, **what would they lose**?
– **Who would punish them?**
– And **how** would they be punished?
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## 8. Student example discussion: China, Xi, and whether hidden information counts as a signal
– A student volunteered an example tied to the **China/Taiwan** case.
### Student contribution
– An **uncertain student** presented a case based on U.S. intelligence reporting:
– **CIA Director William Burns** had publicly said U.S. intelligence was certain that **Xi Jinping** had ordered the **PLA** to be ready to take Taiwan by **2027**.
– The student connected this to:
– the next **Party Congress**,
– Xi’s political future,
– and the risk that if he failed to act after such a commitment, he could jeopardize elite support or reelection / retention of power.
### Instructor response: is it actually a signal?
– The instructor treated the example as promising but pushed students on an important methodological issue:
– if the information comes from **intelligence discovery** rather than an openly intended message,
– is it really a **signal**?
– A distinction was drawn between:
– information that is **intended to be seen by the adversary**, and
– information that an adversary **happens to uncover** despite secrecy.
– The instructor clarified that:
– a hidden action can still count as a signal **if** the sender expected the target’s intelligence services to discover it;
– but if it was truly meant to remain secret and was only uncovered by chance, then it may be better understood as **revealed information**, not signaling in the strict sense.
### Theoretical point reinforced
– The instructor emphasized that identifying a signal often involves **argument and interpretation**, not an entirely objective checklist.
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## 9. Clarifying punishment and legitimacy in the China case
– After the Xi example, a student pushed further on the question of **who exactly punishes** the leader.
### Student contribution
– An **uncertain student** (transcribed as something like **“Glacia”**; no confident roster match) steered the discussion back to the issue of punishment and legitimacy.
### Instructor clarification
– The instructor explained that “losing legitimacy” should not remain abstract:
– it means losing the support of those needed to stay in office;
– in democratic systems this may be voters;
– in party-based authoritarian systems this may be **party elites** or bureaucratic selectors.
– In the China case, the instructor leaned toward the audience being the **party**, not the mass public alone.
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## 10. Student example discussion: Trump, Denmark, and Greenland
– The instructor requested one more example before moving to the main group task.
### Student contribution
– **Orolova Altynai Sharshenalyevna** presented an example tied to the **U.S.–Denmark–Greenland** case.
– Her contribution referenced Trump, negotiations over Greenland, and the cancellation of a visit to Denmark as part of the case dynamic.
### Instructor response
– The instructor used this example to sharpen the concept:
– canceling a visit to Denmark may be a **reaction** or a **punishment**,
– but it is not automatically a **costly signal** in the hand-tying sense.
– The instructor distinguished between:
– an act that punishes or expresses displeasure after the fact,
– and an act that **commits the sender** so that they would incur costs if they later backed down.
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## 11. Transition to the main class activity: return to argumentative chains
– The instructor then reminded students of the earlier assignment from two weeks prior:
– students had built **argumentative chains** in which they forecasted a likely future outcome in their case and explained why it was or was not likely.
– Students were asked to sit with their established **groups**.
– The instructor indicated that these earlier chains would now be revisited through the lens of signaling.
### Interim task before reconstruction
Before reconstructing the chains, students were first asked to:
– revisit the signals they had identified in Tuesday’s class;
– run another round of **criticism**;
– play **devil’s advocate** and argue that their partner’s “costly signal” was **not actually costly**.
### The critical question for students
– If the leader backed away from the promise, **would anything really happen**?
– If not, then perhaps the example is **not a strong costly signal** after all.
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## 12. eCourse upload and board reconstruction of argumentative chains
– The instructor uploaded photos of students’ old argumentative chains to **eCourse** during class.
– Students were told that:
– the uploaded files were **not labeled**,
– so they would need to click through to find their own group’s image.
– Once located, groups were instructed to:
– **reconstruct their argumentative chain** on the board as quickly as possible,
– then begin **attaching signals** to those predicted future outcomes in their case study.
### Purpose of this phase
– The goal was not only to make a forecast,
– but to ask:
– **what signals can we observe that make this future outcome more or less likely?**
– and **how costly / credible are those signals?**
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## 13. Group report-out: U.S.–Greenland / Denmark case
– The instructor first called on the **U.S.–Greenland / Denmark** group.
### Group contribution
– The group argued that **Greenland / Denmark**, with support from **NATO**, were sending a signal to the United States through:
– **troop positioning**,
– and **military drills / demonstrations** in or around Greenland.
– Their initial framing emphasized the **costs to the U.S.** if America attacked.
### Instructor refinement
– The instructor redirected the group toward the audience-cost logic:
– the stronger point is not only that the U.S. would face military resistance,
– but that Denmark / Greenland are creating a situation where **they themselves would have to respond** if challenged.
– The instructor then presented a hypothetical:
– if U.S. troops landed in Greenland during these drills,
– and Danish / Greenlandic / NATO forces did **nothing**,
– what would Denmark and Greenland lose?
### Conclusion drawn in discussion
– The answer developed was:
– they would lose **political legitimacy**,
– because a government’s basic role is to **protect its territory and people**.
– Therefore, troop deployments and defensive posture can function as a costly signal not merely because they impose costs on the attacker, but because they make inaction **politically costly for the defender**.
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## 14. Group report-out: U.S.–Taiwan / China case
– The next group reported on the **U.S.–Taiwan / China** case.
### Group contribution
– The group appeared to consider at least two possible signals:
1. a **U.S. arms package / arms deal** for Taiwan;
2. **Chinese diplomatic warnings** communicated through an ambassadorial statement.
– The instructor helped separate these by direction:
– one is a **signal from the U.S. to China**,
– the other is a **signal from China to the U.S.**
### Instructor refinement of the arms-deal example
– The instructor suggested focusing first on the U.S. side:
– if the U.S. promises or allocates major military support to Taiwan,
– why is that more than cheap talk?
### Costs discussed
The instructor highlighted two possible types of cost:
1. **Sunk cost / material cost**
– a very large arms commitment is expensive;
– once made, it represents a significant investment.
2. **Audience cost / reputational cost**
– if the U.S. later abandons Taiwan after making such a promise,
– this may damage U.S. credibility with **other allies and partners**.
– The instructor’s example was that other countries may think:
– if the U.S. backed away from Taiwan under pressure,
– why should they trust American commitments in their own cases?
### Main point from this presentation
– The group’s case helped illustrate that a signal’s credibility may rest on both:
– **material investments already made**, and
– the **broader reputational costs** of backing down.
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## 15. Closing and preview of next class
– The instructor told students that the class would **return to these board chains on Tuesday**.
– The instructor said they would **take pictures** of the work.
– Planned continuation:
– further discussion of the **costliness of signals**,
– and a transition into **superforecasting**, described as the “real fun stuff.”
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# Student Tracker
– **Jaimes Elena Mary** — identified that states misrepresent both **military capability** and **willingness to fight**, listed several of Fearon’s costly-signal mechanisms, and contributed to the discussion of domestic / party-based audience costs in the China case.
– **Orolova Altynai Sharshenalyevna** — offered a **Trump–Denmark–Greenland** example involving negotiations and the cancellation of a Denmark visit as a possible signal.
– **Mamadboqirova Muqaddas Mamadboqirovna** *(likely; transcript uncertain as “Muka/Mukhadasan”)* — appears to have contributed to the discussion of **alliance commitments / Warsaw Pact-style costs**, and was later noted as no longer present during group work.
– **Uncertain student (China/Taiwan case presenter)** — introduced the example involving **CIA reporting on Xi and PLA readiness by 2027**, linking it to party support and political survival.
– **Uncertain student (“Glacia” / inaudible)** — pushed the class to specify **who exactly punishes leaders** when audience costs materialize, helping clarify the meaning of legitimacy loss.
– **Uncertain student/group (U.S.–Greenland case)** — argued that **Denmark / Greenland / NATO troop positioning and drills** were a signal to the United States.
– **Uncertain student/group (U.S.–Taiwan case)** — proposed the **U.S. arms commitment to Taiwan** and Chinese diplomatic warnings as signaling examples, prompting a discussion of sunk costs versus audience costs.
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# Actionable Items
## High priority
– **Clarify attendance status** of **Muqaddas Mamadboqirova** *(likely)* — transcript suggests she may have been absent or may have left mid-class, but this is not fully clear.
– **Preserve / organize group work artifacts** — the argumentative-chain files uploaded to eCourse were unlabeled; labeling them later would make follow-up easier.
## Medium priority
– **Revisit the distinction between “signal” and “discovered information”** — especially in cases involving intelligence reports or covert military preparation.
– **Continue testing whether examples are truly costly signals** — several student cases still need clearer differentiation between:
– audience costs,
– sunk costs,
– alliance costs,
– and simple punishments / consequences.
## Lower priority / next class planning
– **Return to reconstructed argumentative chains on Tuesday** and photograph final board versions.
– **Continue the costliness-of-signals discussion** before moving into **superforecasting**.
– **No new homework was explicitly assigned in the transcript.**
Homework Instructions:
NO HOMEWORK
No new homework was assigned in this lesson; the only homework mentioned was a past assignment (“If you remember for homework I asked you guys to go through Fearin…”), and the professor ended by saying “We will be coming back to this… I’ll see y’all on Tuesday,” which indicates the work on signals and argumentative chains would continue in class rather than as a take-home assignment.